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INTRODUCTION
Time named the “silence breakers”—women who have bravely spoken out
against sexual assault in myriad workplaces and contexts, and launched the
#MeToo movement—the “Person of the Year” in 2017.1 The Time cover story
quite literally brought the ongoing “reckoning” of women victims standing up
to abusers to the forefront: “[Women have] had it with the fear of retaliation,
of being blackballed . . . . They’ve had it with the code of going along to get
along. They’ve had it with men who use their power to take what they want
from women.”2 This narrative—and the general reckoning of #MeToo—failed
to consider, however, the plight of one of America’s most at-risk populations
suffering unabated sexual abuse: incarcerated women.3
That incarcerated women experience the traumas of sexual assault and
abuse by male guards is not new.4 According to the U.S. Department of
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), allegations of sexual misconduct
in prisons are on the rise, and approximately half of reported sexual assaults
are allegedly perpetrated by guards against inmates.5 According to a January
2014 BJS report, “[F]emales account for a greater proportion of victims of
staff-on-inmate victimization than they do in the overall inmate population.”6
The prevalence of reported incidents of sexual assault by guards on inmates
is certainly troubling, but it fails to illustrate the truly horrifying nature of
guard-on-inmate sexual assault.7 While underreporting in the general

1 Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, The Silence Breakers,
TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers/.
2 Id.
3 See Cindy Struckman-Johnson et al., Sexual Coercion Reported by Men and Women in Prison, 33 J. SEX
RES. 67, 68 (1996) (“As a consequence of . . . [a] lack of research, conclusive data on the prevalence of
prison assault are unavailable. . . . However, even the most conservative estimates of prisoner sexual assault
rates translate into a high number of victims among inmate populations nationwide.” (citation omitted)).
4 Samiera Saliba, Rape by the System: The Existence and Effects of Sexual Abuse of Women in United
States Prisons, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 293, 323 (2013); see also M. Dyan McGuire, The
Empirical and Legal Realities Surrounding Staff Perpetrated Sexual Abuse of Inmates, 46 CRIM. L. BULL.
428, 431-32 (2010) (“Historically, the concern about inmate and staff sexual contact was primarily
directed at male guards sexually assaulting female inmates. This concern was well-founded.”).
5 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION REPORTED BY ADULT
CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, 2009–11 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svraca0911.pdf
[https://perma.cc/564M-VSL7].
6 Id. at 12.
7 See Kim Shayo Buchanan, Impunity: Sexual Abuse in Women’s Prisons, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 45, 51 (2007) (“Sexual abuse is well known to be severely underreported, both inside and
outside prison.”); see also Hannah Brenner, Kathleen Darcy, Gina Fedock & Sheryl Kubiak, Bars to
Justice: The Impact of Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 521, 555 (2016) (“The
reality both inside and outside prison is that sexual violence is a highly underreported crime.
National data suggests that only 8% of prisoners report their sexual victimization during
incarceration.” (footnote omitted)).
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population makes incidents of sexual assault difficult to quantify, this
phenomenon is especially acute in the custodial context,
The reasons for underreporting of sexual assault on the outside are redoubled in
prison. Women cannot trust that their reports will remain confidential, concerns
about retaliation are very real, they feel that the process is stacked against them, and
they continue to be at the mercy of their abusers, with no opportunity for escape.8

Even when female inmates do report the guards who abuse them, their
complaints are subject to vigorous scrutiny designed to either deter reporting
entirely or to make cases so difficult to sustain that civil claims or criminal charges
are only rarely brought successfully.9
In 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act (the “PREA”),
which set forth various policies and provisions aimed at ending custodial sexual
assault.10 The PREA “mandated data collection about prison rape as defined by
the state,”11 created a “zero tolerance” policy for “all forms of sexual abuse and
sexual harassment,” and required the implementation of “PREA coordinator[s]”
whose responsibility it would be “to develop, implement, and oversee agency
efforts to comply with the PREA standards in all of its facilities.”12 However, the
PREA “does not contain any significant new initiatives to end the sexual
victimization of incarcerated women . . . . In fact, the administrative rules
implementing the PREA candidly acknowledge it may have no measurable effect
whatsoever.”13 The continued prevalence of guard-on-inmate sexual assault
demonstrates the PREA’s ineffectiveness.14 This Comment undertakes to explore
Buchanan, supra note 7, at 66-67.
See Alysia Santo, Preying on Prisoners: In Texas, Staffers Rarely Go to Jail for Sexually Abusing
Inmates,
THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(June
17,
2015),
https://www.themarshall
project.org/2015/06/17/preying-on-prisoners [https://perma.cc/7KW8-RVPU] (“But even where
there is enough evidence to prove a staff member had sexual contact with an inmate, criminal
sanctions are rare. Fewer than half are referred for prosecution. Accountability dwindles further
from there.”); see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 65-66 (describing “corroboration requirement[s]”
that make reporting sexual abuse by prison guards extremely dangerous and that create further
obstacles to meaningful accountability); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 5 (“The
most common outcome of investigations was a determination that the evidence was insufficient to
show whether the alleged incident occurred, i.e., the allegation was unsubstantiated.”).
10 28 C.F.R. § 115 (2018); see also NATIONAL PREA RESOURCE CENTER, https://www.prearesource
center.org/about/prison-rape-elimination-act-prea [https://perma.cc/WD7J-H4UU] (last visited Dec. 5, 2017).
11 Michelle VanNatta, Conceptualizing and Stopping State Sexual Violence Against Incarcerated
Women, 37 SOC. JUST. 27, 30 (2010).
12 28 C.F.R. §§ 115.11(a)–(b).
13 David W. Frank, Abandoned: Abolishing Female Prisons To Prevent Sexual Abuse and Herald an
End to Incarceration, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 1, 13 (2014)
14 See Cierra Simpson, Comment, Inevitable Horrors: Sexual Assault in Prison, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
145, 164 (2015) (“PREA has not accomplished its goals because inmate sexual assault is too large of an issue
to control without additional help.”). See generally Julie K. Brown, Bartered Sex, Corruption and Cover-Ups
Behind Bars in Nation’s Largest Women’s Prison, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 13, 2015), http://www.miami
herald.com/news/special-reports/florida-prisons/article49175685.html; Joseph Goldstein, Brooklyn Prison
8
9
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the feasibility of criminal liability for guards who sexually assault women inmates,
given the PREA’s general failure to slow or stop sexual violence in prisons.15
Given the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),16 which seeks to curb
prisoner civil litigation in federal courts, and the PREA’s ineffectiveness,
criminal redress is a possible, if unlikely, avenue for incarcerated women to seek
recourse for the sexual harms they suffer during their terms of imprisonment.
While criminal complaints are possible in theory, they prove improbable in
practice given the procedural and systemic challenges to prisoners bringing
successful legal claims generally, and to incarcerated persons—especially
women—making out criminal complaints against guards for sexual violence in
particular. The myriad hurdles that combine to make criminal redress difficult
to imagine in this context—including the lack of a criminal pro se equivalent
and prosecutorial discretion that dictates criminal proceedings in the United
States, as well as general credibility issues and power dynamics—have not
rendered all attempts at imposing criminal liability entirely futile. Mechanisms
and procedures could be made more robust in order to make criminal
complaints a more effective and promising mode of redress for women who are
sexually assaulted while incarcerated. Furthermore, if criminal prosecutions are
pursued and terms of incarceration for assailant-guards are actually handed
down, criminal punishments against guards who assault female inmates may act
as a deterrent of male-guard-on-female-inmate sexual violence.17
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I further identifies the problem of
male guards sexually assaulting female inmates and discusses some of the
underlying power dynamics at issue in the prison context. Part II identifies legal
barriers that inmates face to accessing the courts, including the PLRA, and Part
III discusses existing remedies and modes of civil recourse. Part IV considers
criminal redress as a path to improve the prospect of holding guards accountable
Supervisors Charged with Sexually Assaulting Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/05/25/nyregion/prison-supervisors-sex-abuse-prevention-rape charges.html?mcubz=1.
15 This Comment does not address the PREA in detail, but rather begins with the assumption that it
has been largely ineffective. For more comprehensive and helpful reviews of the PREA, see Robert W.
Dumond, Confronting America’s Most Ignored Crime Problem: The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 31 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 354, 358 (2003); Maureen Brocco, Note, Facing the Facts: The Guarantee Against Cruel
and Unusual Punishment in Light of PLRA, Iqbal, and PREA, 16 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 917, 939-43 (2013).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012).
17 This Comment is limited in scope to discussing male guards’ sexual abuse of female inmates.
Male-guard-on-male-inmate and inmate-on-inmate sexual violence are certainly problems, as is,
assuredly, female-guard-on-male-inmate violence.
Cases claiming rapes or other serious assaults by female guards against male inmates are
exceedingly rare . . . . By contrast, there are many cases involving female inmates and male
guards replete with confirmed instances of serious rape or forcible sexual assault . . . . In
addition to heterosexual assaults, inmates are also at risk of sexual abuse by same-sex guards.
McGuire, supra note 4, at 432.
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for sexually assaulting female inmates. Part V concludes by exploring how
feminist legal advocacy might address the issues identified in this Comment.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM
Sexual assaults perpetrated by male prison guards against female inmates are
endemic to the American carceral system.18 Academics and the news media alike
consistently report that “[d]espite the fact that all forms of staff and inmate sexual
conduct are illegal or at least administratively proscribed and awareness that all
prisoners are potential victims of such abuse has begun to dawn, such assaults have
not abated.”19 Indeed, “[w]omen are disproportionately sexually abused by prison
staff. Nationwide, they represent 7% of all prisoners, yet they account for 33% of
staff-on-inmate victims, according to the latest Justice Department study.”20 Sexual
abuse in this context manifests in various forms, ranging from namecalling and
“[v]erbal harassment” to forcible rape.21 The nature and structure of women’s
prisons, where predominantly male guards are given virtually complete control over
women who have nowhere to hide from abusers, and the inherent power dynamics
in these institutions, helpfully explain the particular problem of guard-on-inmate
sexual violence.22 As Lora Bex Lempert argues, incarcerated “[w]omen, under the
best of circumstances, are at the mercy of the officers who guard them.”23
A. Gender and Intersectional Hierarchies
Female prison populations, along with the general mass incarceration
problem in the United States, have exploded.24 The Sentencing Project
18 Saliba, supra note 4, at 323 (“Sexual abuse of imprisoned women . . . has become part of the
prison sentence on a de facto basis.”).
19 McGuire, supra note 4, at 4; see also Brown, supra note 14 (documenting multiple abuses by
guard, but concluding that “perhaps the worst indignity of all, women say, is that the officers—both
male and female—use their positions of power to pressure inmates to have sex and to perform
indecent acts.”); VanNatta, supra note 11, at 30 (“Studies show that the rate of sexual violence against
those in women’s prisons is significant, even as forms and rates vary.”).
20 Santo, supra note 9.
21 For a comprehensive “continuum of staff sexual misconduct,” see BARBARA OWEN, JAMES
WELLS, & JOCELYN POLLOCK, IN SEARCH OF SAFETY: CONFRONTING INEQUALITY IN
WOMEN’S IMPRISONMENT 156-164 (2017).
22 Amy Laderberg, The “Dirty Little Secret”: Why Class Actions Have Emerged as the Only Viable
Option for Women Inmates Attempting To Satisfy the Subjective Prong of the Eighth Amendment in Suits for
Custodial Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 323, 324 (1998).
23 LORA BEX LEMPERT, WOMEN DOING LIFE: GENDER, PUNISHMENT, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY 170 (2016).
24 Incarcerated Women and Girls, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Nov. 2015),
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Incarcerated-Women-and-Girls.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HJJ4-9VV3]; see also INSIDE THIS PLACE, NOT OF IT: NARRATIVES FROM
WOMEN’S PRISONS 12 (Robin Levi & Ayelet Waldman eds., 2011) (“Today, women are the fastest
growing segment of the prison population, and the most vulnerable.”). The Prison Policy Initiative
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reports that “[b]etween 1980 and 2014, the number of incarcerated women
increased by more than 700%, rising from a total of 26,378 in 1980 to 222,061
in 2014.”25 Despite the increase in female inmates, most prison staff are
men.26 Early women’s prisons were staffed solely by female guards.27
Separating men and women inmates in single-gender facilities staffed by
guards of the same sex continued until 1972, at which time Title VII
“protections against sex-based job discrimination . . . were extended to state
employees, including those who were employed by the states’ prison
systems. Female correctional officers successfully used the protections
contained in Title VII to obtain access to jobs in male prisons . . . .”28
However, this also meant that male prison guards could marshal Title VII
to obtain employment opportunities in women’s correctional facilities.29
To work in prisons housing inmates of the opposite sex, both male and
female corrections officers have argued that gender is not a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ).30 Pursuant to Title VII, to establish that
gender is a BFOQ, corrections departments “must show a high correlation
between sex and ability to perform job functions.”31 In Dothard v. Rawlinson,
the Supreme Court held that Alabama’s “statutory height and weight standards
had a discriminatory impact on women applicants” to work as prison guards
in male correctional facilities,32 but being male was a BFOQ “for the job of
correctional counselor in a ‘contact’ position in an Alabama male maximumsecurity penitentiary.”33 Courts since Dothard have cited it to note that the

reports that there were 219,000 women incarcerated in the United States as of 2017. See Aleks Kajstura,
Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2017, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2017women.html [https://perma.cc/RC9H-ANKQ].
25 Incarcerated Women and Girls, supra note 24.
26 See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, STAFF GENDER (2017), https://www.bop.gov/about/
statistics/statistics_staff_gender.jsp [https://perma.cc/2YUY-GYYN] (reporting that 72.9% of prison
staff are men, while 27.1% are women).
27 See Brenda V. Smith, Rethinking Prison Sex: Self-Expression and Safety, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 185, 198 (2006) (discussing the nineteenth century prison reform movement to separate male
and female inmates into single-gender correctional facilities: “One of the major characteristics of
the Reform Movement was the establishment of separate prisons for women. These prisons were
often directed and managed by all-female staff.”).
28 McGuire, supra note 4.
29 See OWEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 136 (noting that when women prison staff sued for equal
employment in men’s prisons, “men too gained the right to work in women’s facilities”).
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (2012).
31 Breiner v. Nev. Dep’t. of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Wash. Dep’t. of Corr., 789 F.3d 979, 987 (9th
Cir. 2015) (“Although limited gender discrimination may be permissible in the prison employment
context, prison administrators do not get a free pass. The Department must have an objective ‘basis
in fact’ for its belief that gender discrimination is ‘reasonably necessary . . .’” (citation omitted)).
32 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
33 Id. at 336-37.
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particular prison conditions that made gender a BFOQ there were “atypical,”
and have required correctional facilities “to identify a concrete, logical basis
for concluding that gender restrictions are ‘reasonably necessary.’”34
Male prison guards and their unions have made successful claims that
gender could not be the basis for assignments to correctional facilities, because
gender in this context could not be a BFOQ. In a 2004 case, the Southern
District of New York held that gender-based assignments of guards to prison
facilities could not be maintained as a BFOQ.35 The court there noted,
[C]ontrolling precedent does not permit gender-based discrimination in
order to prevent hypothetical safety risks posed by a small percentage of male
correction officers, even to the extent the likely wrongdoers are
undetectable ex ante. A valid BFOQ defense requires a factual showing that
“all or substantially all” members of the targeted group would be “unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved.”36

The court found Westchester County’s justification for gender-segregated
staffing unconvincing because the county based its argument on a few “incidents
involving four officers” and thus “failed to establish that all or substantially all
male correction officers pose a risk of inappropriate sexual conduct with female
inmates to justify a complete ban.”37 Westchester County was one of many cases
where a court so held for male corrections officers.38 As a result of this litigation,
“[i]n many states, men now make up the majority of custodial staff.”39
Male guards working in women’s correctional facilities engender a uniquely
predatory environment.40 Where male guards are responsible for—and have
34 Breiner, 610 F.3d at 1212; see also Henry v. Milwaukee Cty., 539 F.3d 573, 579 (7th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Dothard for the proposition that “the [BFOQ] defense is ‘meant to be an extremely narrow
exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex.’”).
35 Westchester Cty. Corr. v. Cty. of Westchester, 346 F. Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
36 Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
37 Id. at 534-35.
38 See, e.g., Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (2d Cir. 1980) (vacating the district court’s
determination that male guards could not work the evening shift at a women’s prison; women inmates’
complaints of violations of their privacy could not outweigh Title VII concerns where the prison
facility was willing “to make necessary changes to eliminate the opportunity for viewing . . . that
impair the privacy of the inmates during the nighttime hours.”); Edwards v. Dep’t. of Corr., 615 F.
Supp. 804, 809 (M.D. Ala. 1985) (finding a male prison official’s sex not a bona fide occupational
qualification that defendants could use to justify not promoting him in a women’s correctional
facility). Notably, some circuits do hold that gender can be a BFOQ in women’s prisons in particular.
See, e.g., Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Wash. Dep’t. of Corr., 789 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2015)
(collecting cases from the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, noting that “we and other
circuits similarly have upheld sex-based correctional officer assignments in women’s prisons”).
39 OWEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 136.
40 Cheryl Bell, Martha Coven, John P. Cronan, Christian A. Garza, Janet Guggemos & Laura
Storto, Rape and Sexual Misconduct in the Prison System: Analyzing America’s Most “Open” Secret, 18 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 195, 203 (1999) (noting that because “[t]he prison guards who oversee these female
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ostensibly complete control over—populations of incarcerated women, “[c]rossgender supervision results in a unique set of institutional concerns regarding
privacy, sexual harassment, and sexual misconduct.”41 Incarcerated women “are
dependent on staff for almost everything in the total institution, as they control
all movement and distribute almost every resource.”42 This total dependency of
incarcerated women on male guards entrenches a gendered hierarchy whereby
inmates barter sex for—or engage in sexual relations out of fear of deprivation
of—basic necessities, such as feminine hygiene products, and simple privileges,
such as visitation time with family members.43 Indeed, as of 2006, when the was
still relatively new law, “it ha[d] become increasingly apparent that women in
confinement face a substantial risk of sexual assault, most often by a small number
of ruthless male correctional staff who use terror, retaliation, and repeated
victimization to coerce and intimidate confined women.”44
Given the power inequalities between any given female inmate and prison
staff member, no sexual relationship between them could be consensual. In
fact, the PREA makes consent unavailable as a defense to sexual relations
between guards and inmates.45 As Beck argues,
According to federal law and most state laws, all sexual relations between staff
and inmates are considered abuse, even if the sexual activity would have been
considered consensual had it occurred outside of a prison . . . . Staff and

inmates are predominantly male, [this] creat[es] what some consider a highly sexualized and hostile
environment that invites disaster.”); see also INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 17 (“While abuse in
male prisons is well documented, women in prison suffer in relative anonymity. This disparity is
especially troubling, since women in prison are in many cases more vulnerable to rights violations.”).
41 LEMPERT, supra note 23, at 171.
42 OWEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 136; see also Saliba, supra note 4, at 296 (“The power dynamic
of cross-gender supervision is visible in the everyday lives of female prisoners. Male prison guards
have complete control over the daily activities of the female inmates.”).
43 See INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 232 (“[W]omen often exchange sex to protect their
rights to phone calls, visits, or basic supplies such as food, shampoo, and soap.”); see also Buchanan, supra
note 7, at 57 (noting that “a prisoner who is propositioned by a guard, knowing that the guard will be
able to rape or beat her if she refuses, might well judge it wise to comply to see what she can reap from
her association with a guard”). In a story about a female inmate, “Dorothy,” the ACLU reports: “The
imbalance of power between prisoners and guards leads to the use of both direct physical force and
indirect force based on the prisoners’ total dependence on guards for basic necessities and the guards’
ability to withhold privileges.” ACLU, Words from Prison: Sexual Abuse in Prison, https://www.aclu.org/
other/words-prison-sexual-abuse-prison [https://perma.cc/E4XN-EKUW] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
44 Robert W. Dumond, The Impact of Prisoner Sexual Violence: Challenges of Implementing Public
Law 108-79 The Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 32 J. LEGIS. 142, 158 (2006).
45 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DETERRING STAFF SEXUAL ABUSE
OF FEDERAL INMATES 4 (2005), https://oig.justice.gov/special/0504/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC8W-77GL ]
(“It is important to note that consent is never a legal defense for corrections staff who engage in sexual acts
with inmates. According to federal law, all sexual relations between staff and inmates are considered abuse.”).
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inmates are in inherently unequal positions, and inmates do not have the
same ability as staff members to consent to a sexual relationship.46

In sum, “the social authority and control male custodial officers hold over
incarcerated women creates a ‘super authority’ and . . . the gaze of male
guards . . . creates an atmosphere of threat.”47 Consent cannot be
meaningfully given in this context.48
The gendered power dynamics at work in women’s prisons are only
compounded by race. The majority of incarcerated women in the United States
are women of color.49 In fact, “Black women are the fastest-growing population
in prisons.”50 Meanwhile, according to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 62.9% of
prison staff are white (non-Hispanic).51 Therefore, racial hierarchies exacerbate
institutional power dynamics from which incarcerated women are already
suffering. What results is at least three tiers of systemic oppression of
incarcerated women, who are mostly women of color: (1) the inherent guardinmate hierarchy of any prison; (2) a gendered power hierarchy where female
inmates are subject to supervision by male guards; and (3) these power
dynamics are further aggravated along racial lines where white men are
guarding—and preying upon—incarcerated women of color. There are likely
no two other sociocultural groups so disparate; intersections of race and gender
within the prison context make these power dynamics particularly problematic
and self-perpetuating.52 As Buchanan notes: “Women, especially women of

46 Allen J. Beck, Staff Sexual Misconduct: Implications of PREA for Women Working in Corrections,
16 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 8, 9 (2015).
47 VanNatta, supra note 11, at 29.
48 One may take issue with a law that deprives inmates prima facie of autonomy in the form of the ability
to consent to sexual relations with a prison staff member. For example, “[c]haracterizing their liaisons as
consensual is empowering to women who have little power otherwise.” LEMPERT, supra note 23, at 171. Further,

[w]omen prisoners are not a homogenous group of passive victims and can exercise
agency within these constrained choices of sexual behavior . . . . [I]t may be the case
that such relationships are truly consensual, or it may be that such relationships can
be understood as the tactics of the oppressed . . . .
OWEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 154. Ultimately, however, a female inmate’s “claims of consent [in
these situations] mask the predatory nature of the sexual liaisons.” LEMPERT, supra note 23, at 172.
49 See Buchanan, supra note 7, at 48 (“[M]ore than two thirds of women in U.S. prisons are
African American or Latina.”).
50 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 246.
51 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Staff Ethnicity/Race, (2017), https://www.bop.gov/about/
statistics/statistics_staff_ethnicity_race.jsp [https://perma.cc/M2BB-26A5].
52 MAXINE BACA ZINN & BONNIE THORNTON DILL, WOMEN OF COLOR IN U.S. SOCIETY
4, 10 (1993) (describing how “[w]omen of color are subordinated . . . because [of] patterns of
hierarchy, domination, and oppression based on race, class, gender, and sexual orientation” and that
“[w]hite males . . . set the standards by which all social action is measured”).
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color, are exposed to institutionalized sexual abuse, while a network of legal
rules prevents them from seeking protection or redress in the courts.”53
B. Reporting Abuse in the Prison Context: Fear and Retaliation
Beginning from the underlying premise that any prison staff-inmate
sexual encounter cannot be consensual, reporting sexual abuse is particularly
dangerous and encumbered by various concerns that a nonincarcerated sexual
abuse victim may not have to consider. There is a huge disincentive to report
abuse by a prison staff member “because [inmates] fear staff reprisal, worry
that others will accuse them of lying, or want to avoid being labeled a
snitch.”54 Incarcerated women abused by prison staff members “have no exit
. . . . Unlike women on the outside, who can move, change jobs, or simply
shop in different neighborhoods, there is no place that imprisoned women
can go to escape predatory, unprofessional officers.”55 Reporting sexual
misconduct by prison staff creates myriad dangers and safety risks for
incarcerated women not only because “the same people being paid to protect
them” are the ones violating them, but also due to “collateral consequences”
that can flow from reporting.56 For example, incarcerated women report being
“placed in disciplinary housing” and “losing [their] privileges” as a result of
making complaints about sexual misconduct by a prison guard.57
The threat of retaliation by the officers themselves is perhaps one of the
greatest deterrents to women inmates reporting sexual abuse. Indeed,
“[r]etaliation against prisoners who report sexual abuse is all too common and
can sometimes result in prisoners having to serve longer terms.”58 In one
account, Teri Hancock, a formerly incarcerated woman, describes prolonged,
violent sexual abuse by the assistant deputy warden of the facility where she

Buchanan, supra note 7, at 55.
Laderberg, supra note 22, at 324; see also Rachel Culley, “The Judge Didn’t Sentence Me to be
Raped”: Tracy Neal v. Michigan Department of Corrections: A 15-Year Battle Against the Sexual Abuse
of Women Inmates in Michigan, 22 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 206, 211 (2012) (“Several factors
discouraged women from speaking up, including fear of punishment or confrontation.”).
55 LEMPERT, supra note 23, at 174; see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 65 (“Outside prison,
women who are raped often find that the experience of reporting their assault . . . is so humiliating
that it is akin to a second rape. Inside prison, women who use the grievance system to report guards’
sexual abuse have been subjected to real second rapes in retaliation.” (citation omitted)).
56 OWEN ET AL. supra note 21, at 164.
57 Id.
58 Bell et al., supra note 40, at 210; see also INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 65 (describing
“the first time [a guard] raped [her]” and that “[e]veryone knew that you couldn’t go to the prison
officials and give a report, because the prison officials wouldn’t do anything other than retaliate
against you. That officer sexually assaulted me for years.”); Saliba, supra note 4, at 299 (“[T]he guard
will most likely assault the woman who complained. Some inmates have reported that the guards
work as a team, one will keep [watch] while the other sexual [sic] assaults the woman inside.”).
53
54
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served her sentence.59 When Teri told a friend about the assaults via mail, the
facility intercepted the letter and sent it to internal affairs, and the prison
warden and his colleagues repeatedly threatened Teri.60 Another formerly
imprisoned woman, Emily Madison, tells a similar story. After reporting a
guard who had sexually assaulted her and raped other inmates, Emily
describes: “The retaliation was horrible. The officers made me submit urine
samples on a weekly basis. They would wake me up on the midnight shift
. . . . They would come and shake my room down.”61
Central to many claims of sexual assault is a credibility problem.62 Here,
“[a]ccusers—typically women—do not tend to fare well in these [he said/she
said] contests.”63 Credibility problems are particularly acute in the maleguard-on-female-inmate sexual assault context because most—if not all—
cases will be “word on word,” and the power differentials inherent to the
prison system make one party (the guard) assumedly more trustworthy than
the complainant-inmate.64 Furthermore, in this context, there is little or no
“corroborative evidence” that there might be in a sexual assault that occurs
outside prison walls.65 Even where there may be a corroborating witness to a
prison sexual assault by a guard, that witness is unlikely to come forward:
where the witness is another inmate, she could also “face potential retaliation
for cooperating,”66 and where the witness is another guard, he is either
complicit in the abuse or unwilling to report a coworker.67
Tuerkheimer describes credibility as comprising two parts: trustworthiness
and plausibility.68 “A listener engages in credibility discounting when, based
upon a faulty preconception, he reduces a speaker’s perceived trustworthiness
or diminishes the plausibility of her account.”69 Credibility “discounting,” as
59 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 96-98.
60 Id. at 98.
61 Id. at 113.
62 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual

Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 9.
65 See id. at 9-10 (describing various types of “[c]orroborative evidence . . . [that] can include electronic
evidence like text messages, voicemails, photographs or social media posts, forensic reports, witnesses to the
lead-up or aftermath, and, on rare occasions, eyewitnesses to the incident.”) (citation omitted). Arguably,
none of these types of corroboration exist with any regularity in the prison sexual assault context.
66 McGuire, supra note 4, at 12; see also INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 65 (in one
inmate’s account of sexual assault, her cellmate knew of the abuse but “she didn’t do or say anything
at the time because she didn’t want to get involved.”).
67 See Frank, supra note 13, at 4-5 (“Guards not only assaulted the women, but served as ‘lookouts’ during assaults by other staff.”); see also VICTORIA LAW, RESISTANCE BEHIND BARS: THE
STRUGGLES OF INCARCERATED WOMEN 63-67 (2009) (describing female prisoners suffering from
retaliation by their abusers’ fellow guards after reporting sexual assaults).
68 Tuerkheimer, supra note 62, at 13-14.
69 Id. at 14.
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Tuerkheimer terms it, is a zero-sum game: “[U]nder certain circumstances—
notably the word-on-word case—a determination that one party is worthy of
belief requires a judgment that the other is not.”70 In the custodial sexual assault
context, this will almost always operate to the detriment of the inmate-victim
whose account is weighed against that of a guard.71
Thus, not only do incarcerated women have well-founded fears of further
abuse and retaliation for reporting, these women have reason to doubt how
their own stories will be perceived. Grounded in baseless stereotypes,
incarcerated women in particular suffer from a severe lack of credibility when
reporting sexual misconduct by prison guards: “Inmates have reported that
prison authorities don’t take the reports of sexual abuse seriously. In fact,
when they do report the abuse, many are ridiculed and may even be
prescribed medication to help with their ‘hallucinations’ as they are often
labeled delusional.”72 In one study, prosecutors consistently described juries’
refusals to believe inmates’ accounts of abuse.73
Prison grievance procedures further reflect this inherent distrust of
inmates’ complaints. Near-impossible hurdles in the form of substantiation and
corroboration requirements—as determined and enforced by the state—force a
prisoner filing a complaint for sexual abuse to provide, for example, “physical
proof or DNA evidence.”74 These procedural requirements “stem[] from prison
authorities’ and courts’ blanket reluctance to accept a prisoner’s word over a
guard’s . . . . [P]risoners face an overt ‘presumption of incredibility’ . . . .”75
Indeed, in a seminal multijurisdictional report on women’s prisons, Human
Rights Watch concluded: “No state we visited adequately ensures that female
prisoners can speedily and effectively complain of such abuse with confidence
that it will be impartially investigated and remedied and without fear that they
will face retaliation or even punishment.”76
As a result, current figures on sexual assaults in prison grossly
underestimate the true extent of the problem. Power dynamics disincentivize
reporting, and when incarcerated victims do report their abuse, they suffer
Id. at 15.
Brown, supra note 14 (“Prosecutors say that without hard evidence, such as DNA or damning
video footage, proving officer misconduct can be impossible.”).
72 Saliba, supra note 4, at 299 (citation omitted).
73 Brenda V. Smith & Jaime M. Yarussi, Prosecuting Sexual Violence in Correctional Settings: Examining
Prosecutors’ Perceptions, 3 AM. U. CRIM. L. BR. 19, 21 (2008) (“Both state and federal prosecutors noted that
while it was easier for juries to understand the abuse of power issue, juries have problems accepting the
credibility of inmates. Juries perceived inmates as liars with a bias against corrections staff.”).
74 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 65; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the
vigorous scrutiny to which prisoner sexual assault complaints are held).
75 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 65-66.
76 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in U.S. State Prisons
(1996), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1996/Us1.htm#_1_19 [https://perma.cc/4XHX-4W5N].
70
71
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harsh, retaliatory consequences. The result is a system that deters reporting
and facilitates unmitigated sexual abuse of incarcerated women.77
II. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS AND ACCESS TO COURTS
When incarcerated women do report sexual abuse by guards, they face
extreme procedural hurdles. First, before they can get to court, inmate
complainants must satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA.78 The
PLRA makes the exhaustion of administrative remedies mandatory.79 Under the
PLRA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Woodford v. Ngo, any incarcerated
person seeking access to the federal courts must “properly exhaust[]” all available
administrative remedies—namely, prison grievance procedures.80 The PLRA,
discussed below, has posed “significant procedural barriers to litigation. Women
in prison are . . . forced to rely on what are often inadequate internal prisongrievance systems.”81 Each of these hurdles will be addressed in turn.
A. Prison Grievance Procedures
First, any prisoner seeking to file a civil claim in federal court must
initially lodge a complaint through the grievance process at the facility where
she is incarcerated.82 Generally, this entails a multistep complaint process.83
As Borchardt details,
First, a prisoner must seek to remedy the complaint through “informal
resolution,” as it is usually called. Although ostensibly “informal,” this first stage
frequently requires a degree of formality, as the grievance may be dismissed for
minor procedural defects: using the wrong form, using the wrong color ink,
attaching additional pages to the requisite form, or describing the complaint with
insufficient specificity. Second, if the informal resolution attempt does not result
in a favorable outcome, the prisoner must file a “formal grievance,” as it is usually
called. Formal grievances require multiple procedural technicalities—such as

77 Anthony C. Thompson, What Happens Behind Locked Doors: The Difficulty of Addressing and
Eliminating Rape in Prison, 35 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 119, 125 (2009) (“Despite
underreporting, the numbers of reported prison rapes reveal a terrifying reality.”).
78 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012).
79 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006).
80 Id. at 92.
81 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 227.
82 Cindy Chen, Note, The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Doing Away with More Than Just
Crunchy Peanut Butter, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 203, 217 (2004) (“The exhaustion of administrative
remedies entails that a prisoner litigant must first process his claims through all of the institutional
grievance procedures before bringing a suit in federal court.”).
83 Derek Borchardt, Note, The Iron Curtain Redrawn Between Prisoners and the Constitution, 43
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 469, 492 (2012).
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using the correct form, attaching the right documentation, naming individuals
and places involved with sufficient specificity, using the right color ink, and
others—for which failure to comply may result in dismissal. Third, if the formal
grievance does not result in a favorable outcome, the prisoner must file an
appeal. Some grievance systems require a second level of appeal, which is the
fourth and usually final stage of the grievance process.84

Prison grievance processes are highly variable because states and
independent bodies within states, including municipalities and even
individual prisons, are responsible for creating and maintaining their own
grievance procedures.85 These procedures sometimes involve ludicrous
deadlines, which, if a prisoner fails to meet, will render her complaint
untimely and will preclude successful progression to the federal court system
because she failed to exhaust her “available” administrative remedies.86 Even
the Supreme Court has recognized that “the deadline for filing an
administrative grievance is generally not very long—14 to 30 days.”87 Indeed,
these procedures “invite[] technical mistakes resulting in inadvertent
noncompliance with the exhaustion requirement, and barring litigants from
court because of their ignorance and uncounselled procedural errors.”88
The prison grievance system is riddled not only with procedural trapdoors
that make deadline and rule-compliant filing extremely difficult, but also with
significant risks to those who do attempt to make use of the system.89 First,
the nature of the system requires a “prisoner to report the abuse to her
abuser’s colleagues through an often-humiliating disciplinary procedure that
is likely to result in retaliation.”90 In addition, these processes are not

Id. at 492-94 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 490.
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006); see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 72 (giving the example
of the New York Department of Corrections, which “imposes a fourteen-day limit for filing any prisoner
grievance, unless the grievance authority determines that ‘mitigating circumstances’ justify the delay.”).
87 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 95.
88 John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 BROOK. L.
REV. 429, 431 (2001); see also Borchardt, supra note 83, at 494 (“Grievance systems generally have
very strict time requirements—usually mere days—that prisoners must satisfy when proceeding
through each stage of the grievance process. Prisoners are deemed to have exhausted the grievance
procedures only when they have successfully completed all stages, satisfying the requisite time limits
and procedural technicalities.” (footnote omitted)).
89 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 76 (“Grievance or investigatory procedures, where they
exist, are often ineffectual, and correctional employees continue to engage in abuse because they believe
they will rarely be held accountable, administratively or criminally. Few people outside the prison walls
know what is going on or care if they do know. Fewer still do anything to address the problem.”).
90 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 73 (footnote omitted).
84
85
86
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confidential, exposing the victim to further abuse.91 As a result, prisoners do
not make use of the prison grievance system. Lori Girshick concludes,
The grievance process can be difficult for inmates to access. It is a risky step more
likely to lead to harassment and retaliation than redress for a wrong done . . . .
Officers always know when a grievance has been filed and the inmate will still be at
the mercy of that officer for further sexual abuse or hassles in daily living. This serves
as a serious disincentive for coming forward and making reports. Inmates report that
sometimes the grievance is thrown into the trash right in front of them.92

B. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
The PLRA was passed with the aim of curbing “frivolous” prisoner
litigation.93 As Margo Schlanger, who has extensively studied and written on
the PLRA and inmate litigation, notes,
The government officials and legislators who were the driving force behind
the PLRA presented the following account of the cases: inmates, they said,
were unduly litigious, making federal cases out of the most trivial mishaps;
the cases were deluging both executive and judicial officials who were
supposed to respond to them . . . .94

The most significant section of the PLRA is its exhaustion requirement, codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion provision mandates: “No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any
other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”95
The Supreme Court further elaborated on the exhaustion provision in two
cases, decided within months of each other: Woodford v. Ngo96 and Jones v.
Bock.97 In Woodford, the Court held that administrative grievance procedures
must be “properly” exhausted, which in the prison context means meeting all

91 Brocco, supra note 15, at 926-27; see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 64 (“Prison staff often fail
to keep prisoner grievances confidential: thus when a prisoner attempts to file a grievance, she often
faces retaliatory harassment, discipline, or even assault by guards.”).
92 Lori B. Girshick, Abused Women and Incarceration, in WOMEN IN PRISON: GENDER AND
SOCIAL CONTROL 95, 109 (Barbara H. Zaitzow & Jim Thomas, eds., 2003).
93 Chen, supra note 82, at 221; see also Brocco, supra note 15, at 925 (“To reduce frivolous lawsuits,
PLRA imposes restrictions on prisoner litigation. The number of complaints filed before and after PLRA’s
passage shows that these restrictions successfully reduced prisoner complaints.”).
94 Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1567 (2003).
95 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012).
96 548 U.S. 81 (2006).
97 549 U.S. 199 (2007).
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deadlines as required by the correctional institution’s grievance system.98
There, respondent-prisoner Ngo argued that administrative remedies were
no longer “available” to him at the correctional facility where he was
incarcerated because time to file had run.99 The Court rejected Ngo’s
argument that “the reason why administrative remedies are no longer
available is irrelevant. Bare unavailability suffices even if this results from a
prisoner’s deliberate strategy of refraining from filing a timely grievance.”100
In turn, the Court held that such an interpretation of the PLRA would nullify
the exhaustion requirement.101 Ngo failed to exhaust administrative remedies
properly on account of lack of compliance with timely grievance filing that
then precluded bringing a civil claim in federal court.102
A few months later, in Jones v. Bock, the Court reiterated the proper
exhaustion requirement of the PLRA.103 The Jones Court held, however, that
exhaustion is not a pleading requirement to be fulfilled by prisoners; failure to
exhaust is an affirmative defense.104 Furthermore, the Court went on to hold that
where a prisoner states multiple claims but fails to exhaust only some, failure to
exhaust part does not defeat an otherwise procedurally compliant whole.105
The exhaustion requirement has worked a significant disadvantage to
prisoner suits. “Claims have been barred despite the fact that special
circumstances—such as illiteracy, physical illness, and mental illness—would have
made compliance with standard grievance procedures impossible.”106 Even
though the exhaustion requirement may be the most daunting PLRA-imposed
hurdle to prisoner litigation,107 it is by no means the only impediment to
prisoners filing civil complaints in federal courts. The PLRA also requires even
indigent prisoners filing pro se to pay filing fees.108 This further distinguishes
98 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-91 (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s
deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively
without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”).
99 Id. at 87-88.
100 Id. at 88.
101 Id. at 95.
102 Id. at 87.
103 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).
104 See id. at 216 (“We conclude that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA,
and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”).
105 See id. at 222 (“A typical PLRA suit with multiple claims, on the other hand, may combine
a wide variety of discrete complaints, about interactions with guards, prison conditions, generally
applicable rules, and so on, seeking different relief on each claim. There is no reason failure to
exhaust on one necessarily affects any other.”).
106 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 229; see also id. (“In one particularly notorious case,
it took a court almost five years to determine that a group of women filing a class action suit alleging
sexual assault had not properly exhausted their administrative remedies.” (citation omitted)).
107 See Buchanan, supra note 7, at 72 (“The most damaging hurdle imposed by the PLRA is its
grievance-exhaustion requirement.”).
108 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2012).
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prisoner-filed suits from other civil suits filed pro se: “In non-prisoner litigation
lawsuits, indigent persons who cannot afford their court costs may file in forma
pauperis, and disregard the costs. This indigent-friendly costs exception is not
available to a prisoner-plaintiff. The only available option is to pay the fees in
installments over time.”109 In addition, the PLRA imposes a three-strikes rule:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil
action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it
is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.110

Another troubling limitation imposed by the PLRA is the physical injury
requirement. This clause mandates that a prisoner make “a prior showing of
physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.”111 The PLRA does not
answer whether custodial sexual assault is itself a physical injury or something
more (e.g. bruising, bleeding, broken bones) is required.112 Courts have
described physical injuries meeting this requirement as those that are
“observable or diagnosable medical condition[s] requiring treatment by a
medical care professional.”113 It is particularly challenging for female inmates
to meet the physical injury requirement because “the courts find the rape of
a woman to be somehow less of an injury than the rape of a man.”114 Given
the frequent lack of corroborating or physical evidence to support a finding
of injury or past sexual act in custodial sexual abuse cases,115 “although the
case law is far from uniform, some courts have deemed sexual assault not to
constitute a ‘physical injury’ within the meaning of the PLRA.”116 Making a
Brocco, supra note 15, at 927 (citations to the PLRA omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2012).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e) (West 2013) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of a sexual act.”).
112 Deborah M. Golden, It’s Not All In My Head: The Harm of Rape and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 45 (2004).
113 Id. at 47; see also Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (supplying this
definition of “physical injury”); Mala v. Pastrana, No. 08-22629, 2009 WL 3055214, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
July 6, 2009) (citing Luong for the same definition).
114 Golden, supra note 112, at 51.
115 See, e.g., Dumond, supra note 44, at 158-59 (2006) (describing the case of Hope Hernandez,
who was raped by a prison guard: “‘Later I told a nurse what had happened, and they took me to
the hospital to do a rape kit. But the officer had used a condom. The rape kit came back . . .
inconclusive.’” (citations omitted)).
116 Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons:
The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139, 144 (2008); see also
Hancock v. Payne, No. Civ.A.103CV671JMRJMR, 2006 WL 21751, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 4, 2006)
(finding the physical injury requirement unsatisfied where “the plaintiffs do not make any claim of
109
110
111
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showing of physical injury first requires reporting the assault, which, as noted
above, inmates are unlikely to do for myriad, compound reasons.117 Further,
this showing demands a collection of evidence by prison authorities—such as
DNA evidence or photographs of marks or bruising—that either may not
result from a particular assault or that the prison may be unable or unwilling
to gather.118 Several authors note that the physical injury requirement
“effectively curtails actions for damages brought by prisoners seeking redress
from rape.”119 This may have been an unintended consequence of the PLRA,
but it is an effect with which prisoners must now contend.120
As a result of these provisions aimed at deterring prisoner suits—and, at
the very least, making them procedurally difficult to bring—prisoner civil
filings were down in the years immediately following passage of the PLRA.121
In 1995, there were 24.6 prisoner civil filings per 1000 prisoners; by 1997, the
year after the PLRA became law, that figure was down to 15.1, and continued
to decrease through 2007, at which point there were only 9.6 civil prisonerfiled claims per 1000 prisoners.122 While the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the exhaustion requirement in Woodford may not have had a similar effect,123
at least in the context of prisoners filing claims of sexual assault and abuse, the
PLRA appears to have operated as intended by curbing not only frivolous
claims, but also potentially meritorious ones. The procedural strictures of the
PLRA, however, leave the relative merits of many such prisoner-filed suits
unknown. The PLRA, in conjunction with prison-specific power dynamics
that engender fear of retaliation at every turn, have effectively operated to
disincentivize and limit prisoner–victims from utilizing grievance procedures
and proceeding with legal redress against guards who assault them.124

physical injury beyond the bare allegation of sexual assault.”); Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner
Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 162 (2015) (“In particular,
prisoners’ cases are thrown out of court for failure to properly complete often-complicated grievance
procedures, or because they do not allege physical injury, which some courts read the PLRA to
require for recovery even in constitutional cases.” (citation omitted)).
117 See supra Part I.
118 David K. Ries, Note, Duty-to-Protect Claims by Inmates After the Prison Rape Elimination Act,
13 J.L. & POL’Y 915, 938 (2005).
119 Golden, supra note 112, at 38; see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 73 (“On its face, however, the
physical injury requirement appears to bar prisoner claims for sexual abuse if no physical injury results.”).
120 See Golden, supra note 112, at 44-45 (“Even those lawmakers who opposed the enactment
of the PLRA did not raise the issue of rape cases.”).
121 See Schlanger, supra note 116, at 155-56 (2015) (“In 1996, the PLRA immediately transformed the
litigation landscape. After a very steep decline in both filings and filing rates in 1996 and 1997, rates continued
to shrink for another decade. Since 2007, filing rates, prison population, and filings have all plateaued.”).
122 Id. at 157.
123 Elana M. Stern, Comment, Completely Exhausted: Evaluating the Impact of Woodford v. Ngo
on Prisoner Litigation in Federal Courts, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1511, 1512-13 (2018).
124 Golden, supra note 112, at 60.
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C. Pleading Requirements
A final point to consider here is that when prisoners do file a claim, most
do so pro se.125 Unlike in “criminal and administrative [proceedings that] are
largely ‘out of the victim’s hands’ in that prosecutors or prison administrators
must initiate and pursue the cases against the assailants,”126 here a prisonerclaimant remains the master of her own case, but she does so at her peril.
Under federal pleading requirements, an inmate must state her claim with
sufficient facts to meet a standard of plausibility.127 This heightened pleading
standard is especially arduous for inmates, who represent themselves and are
without access to resources for or assistance with conducting formalities of
litigation, such as legal research and fact discovery.128 As a result, meeting the
pleading requirements is yet another procedural hurdle that makes sustaining
prisoners’ pro se civil claims nearly impossible.129
III. EXISTING REMEDIES AND LITIGATION
While male-guard-on-female-inmate sexual abuse is rarely the subject of civil
litigation or criminal prosecution,130 not all prisoner-brought litigation is
fruitless.131 The Supreme Court has recognized that “rape or other violence . . .
serves absolutely no penological purpose.”132 In Farmer v. Brennan, the Court held
that prison officials’ displays of “deliberate indifference” toward “a substantial
risk of serious harm to an inmate” constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.133
Farmer concerned a transgender inmate’s complaints that guards displayed
deliberate indifference to her safety by placing her in the general prison
population at a male correctional facility despite her appearance that “project[ed]
125 Brocco, supra note 15, at 928-29; see also Hon. Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation:
Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519, 519 (1996) (“Prisoner lawsuits challenging
prison conditions share two characteristics. Nearly all of these lawsuits are filed pro se, and the vast
majority are dismissed as frivolous.”).
126 McGuire, supra note 4.
127 See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
128 Brocco, supra note 15, at 929; see also id. at 930-36 (detailing the pleading requirements for
federal complaints); Chen, supra note 82, at 215 (“A great deal of prisoners do not have adequate
schooling, have learning disabilities, and are ‘functionally illiterate.’ It is not easy for a prisoner to
simply draft up a complaint that would communicate the extent of his injuries so that they represent
a cognizable legal claim.” (internal citation omitted)).
129 Brocco, supra note 15, at 930-36.
130 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 227.
131 For a comprehensive sampling of federal civil suits by circuit, see generally Brenda V. Smith
& Melissa C. Loomis, Sexual Abuse in Custody: A Case Law Study, NATIONAL PREA RESOURCE
CENTER (Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.prearesourcecenter.org/sites/default/files/library/sexualabuse
casescaselawsurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNC7-WUSV].
132 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
133 Id. at 828 (majority opinion).
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feminine characteristics.”134 The Farmer Court defined “deliberate indifference”
on the part of a prison guard as a subjective standard, where “the official knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”135 Female
inmates have been able to bring cognizable and successful federal and state civil
claims to seek redress for sexual harm suffered while incarcerated. Most of these
cases are brought in federal court,136 most commonly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.137
Section 1983 claims, however, also create multiple challenges for prisonerlitigants, which will be discussed in the latter part of this section.
A. Some Success Stories
Where female inmates have successfully brought federal civil actions, they
have generally done so as a class.138 For example, in Women Prisoners v. District of
Columbia,139 a class of female inmates succeeded at the district court level.140 In
addition to detailing “countless incidents of sexual misconduct between prison
employees and female prisoners[,]”141 the plaintiff class also mounted an
extensive, expert-laden case, “address[ing] the flaws in the Inmate Grievance
Procedure, the lack of specific staff training, the absence of confidentiality of
complaints, the inadequacy of the investigations, and the prison’s repeated
failures to take remedial action.”142 In the aftermath of Women Prisoners, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld a jury verdict finding deliberate
indifference where a single inmate alleged that she was forced to perform a
striptease for prison guards.143 In a Massachusetts federal case, Kane v. Winn, the
court noted: “In other litigation, the federal government has . . . reached
substantial settlements with the states of Arizona and Michigan

Id. at 830-31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 837.
Bell et al., supra note 40, at 214.
Ashley E. Day, Cruel and Unusual Punishment of Female Inmates: The Need for Redress Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 555, 557 (1998) (“The main legal channel for female
prisoners who file a cause of action alleging abuse by male prison guards is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which addresses violations of constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment.”).
138 See Laderberg, supra note 22, at 326 (“[C]lass action suits under the Eighth Amendment
have emerged as the best option for prisoners wishing to obtain injunctive relief from custodial
abuse in American prisons.”); see also id. at 341 (“The prison administration often has ignored or
dismissed individual incidents of sexual abuse . . . .”).
139 877 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part, modified in part, 899 F. Supp. 659 (D.D.C.
1995), remanded by 95 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
140 Bell, et al., supra note 40, at 217.
141 Id. at 216.
142 Laderberg, supra note 22, at 354.
143 Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
134
135
136
137
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regarding sexual misconduct and privacy violations that female inmates have
suffered at the hands of prison guards.”144 More recently, in a § 1983 class action
suit in the Southern District of New York, currently-incarcerated women alleged
multiple incidents of abuse by prison guards, including retaliation for reporting
abuse.145 Plaintiffs in this suit sought redress under the Eighth Amendment.146
On the state level, Tracy Neal v. Michigan Department of Corrections serves
as another example of successful prisoner class action litigation to address
sexual abuse.147 In Neal, “[t]he allegations involved sexual abuse spanning
more than two decades and several administrations.”148 Despite a protracted
history, the case resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiffs, who were inmates,
along with a monetary damages award of over $15 million.149
B. No Guarantees: Stumbling Blocks and Cases Lost
Filing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 remains a challenge for prisoners—
especially those filing pro se—and formerly incarcerated individuals trying to
state a claim about what occurred during their confinement. In order to sustain
a § 1983 claim for Eighth Amendment violations, a complaint must “allege a
deprivation of a civil right.”150 Furthermore, “the plaintiff must prove that the
party acted under color of law.”151 It is difficult for abused inmates to meet the
requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the person acting “under color of
state law”152 must do so with “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or

319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 187 (D. Mass. 2004).
Complaint at 5-45, Jane Jones et al. v. Annucci, https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.
php?id=15190 [https://perma.cc/UU5P-KWE5].
146 Id. at 2. The suit was voluntarily dismissed by the parties in December 2016. Civil Rights
Litigation Clearinghouse, Case Profile: Jane Jones v. Annucci, https://www.clearinghouse.net/
detail.php?id=15190 [https://perma.cc/7HQA-FCFQ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
147 Culley, supra note 54, at 207.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Day, supra note 137, at 557.
151 Id.
152 Id. The statute mandates that
144
145

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
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safety.”153 Making a sufficient showing of subjective deliberate indifference
under Farmer is a burden that many prisoners filing pro se cannot meet.154
Furthermore, as government authorities, prison personnel enjoy qualified
immunity.155 The Supreme Court has held that “an official is entitled to
immunity unless his conduct violates a ‘clearly established’ constitutional
right.”156 Additionally, “institutional liability is available only if the prisoner
can prove that the guard’s unconstitutional conduct resulted from a
governmental custom, policy, rule, or practice.”157 In some instances, courts
have held that “[w]here guards themselves are responsible for the rape and
sexual abuse of inmates, qualified immunity offers no shield.”158 But courts do
not so uniformly hold.159 Indeed, “as interpreted by the circuit courts, Farmer
has significantly limited the circumstances in which judges can hold prison
officials accountable.”160 Thus, it is almost impossible for an inmate filing a
Section 1983 action pro se to do so successfully.161
In addition to pleading and immunity problems, prisoners are up against
statutes of limitations. Section 1983 does not have an independent statute of
limitations, but rather, federal courts apply the relevant state statute of limitations,
which ranges from one to three years.162 Not only may prisoners be unaware of
the statutes of limitations applicable to their claims, but an otherwise meritorious
claim “may be precluded altogether if the statute of limitations for the Section
1983 claim expires before the prisoner has exhausted all administrative

153 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 825 (1994); see also Buchanan, supra note 7, at 85 (“Any
abuse or oppression of prisoners, no matter how cruel or unusual, is constitutionally permitted unless
the prisoner can prove that the prison official engaged in deliberate ‘unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain . . .’”).
154 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 85 (“A purely objective showing of deliberate indifference—
negligence or gross negligence—is not enough.”).
155 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 75.
156 Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of
Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126 (1985) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
157 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 75.
158 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original) (citing
Mathie v. Fries, 935 F. Supp. 1284, 1301 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding defendant liable under section 1983
where “[t]he sexual abuse and sodomy perpetrated . . . against the powerless inmate was applied
maliciously and sadistically in order to afford personal gratification to [defendant]. These malicious
acts violated all contemporary standards of decency.”)); see also Ware v. Jackson Cty., 150 F.3d 873,
876-87 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding finding of section 1983 liability where inmate successfully alleged
“rampant sexual misconduct of employees at the [correctional facility] toward female inmates.”).
159 See Bell, et al., supra note 40, at 213 (“In Carrigan v. Delaware, even when an official was
aware of incidents of sexual harassment within his prison, that awareness was not sufficient to
constitute ‘deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.’”).
160 Id.
161 Buchanan, supra note 7, at 75.
162 Chen, supra note 82, at 224-25.
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remedies.”163 As a result, statutes of limitations further compound exhaustion
requirements to keep inmates’ claims out of court on procedural grounds.164
More often than not, inmates’ complaints of sexual abuse result in little
or no action by the prison, and guards suffer few, if any, consequences. Guards
against whom grievances are lodged will sometimes get transferred to other
facilities or lose their jobs as “punishment.”165 Indeed, “correctional staff are
allowed to resign, an administrative sanction, in lieu of being criminally
prosecuted for sexual abuse with persons in custody.”166 Even where legal
action ensues, accused guards have not necessarily even faced those
repercussions: in an Ohio case settled during the course of litigation, the
accused guard “was fired and then reinstated with the stipulation that he
not work with female inmates, according to court documents.”167 The lack
of severe sanctions—criminal or otherwise—for guards who sexually
assault inmates is not merely anecdotal: in a report based on data from
2009-2011, BJS concluded that “[t]he most commonly imposed sanctions
for staff sexual misconduct were loss of job (in 85% of incidents) . . . .”168
A case example illustrates the shortcomings and challenges of inmate
civil litigation. In a Section 1983 case brought in the Southern District of
New York and appealed to the Second Circuit, the courts found that a
group of currently and formerly incarcerated women could not proceed
with their claims of sexual abuse and harassment by prison officials at
several correctional facilities for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
and further concluded that no “special circumstances” existed to “excuse
163 Antonieta Pimienta, Note, Overcoming Administrative Silence in Prisoner Litigation: Grievance
Specificity and the “Object Intelligibly” Standard, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1209, 1219 (2014).
164 See supra Part II.
165 See Brown, supra note 14 (“The so-called punishment for an officer who rapes an inmate is
to get transferred to another facility.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
166 Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 21.
167 Eric Heisig, Ohio Will Pay $525,000 to Cleveland Woman Who Accused Prison Guard of Sexual
Assault, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2017/10/
ohio_will_pay_525000_to_clevel.html [https://perma.cc/6G62-W3M8]; see also John Rudolf, Alabama
Women’s Prison Inmates Sexually Abused by Guards, Report Says, HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2012,
7:27 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/22/alabama-womens-prison-sexual-abuse_n_
1537623.html [https://perma.cc/MP4V-ECXL] (reporting on an Alabama women’s prison where
sexual abuse is rampant: “All of the charges [against prison guards] were settled with plea bargains,
and only one prison employee served more than six days in jail.”).
168 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 5, at 2; see also Simon McCormack, Prison Staff
Not Held Accountable for Sexual Abuse of Inmates: Report, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2014, 4:54 PM,
updated Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/24/prison-staff-sex-abuse-report_
n_4661485.html [https://perma.cc/FXU6-DRJH] (referencing the 2014 BJS report: “The report also said
that just 27 percent of staff who were referred for prosecution were arrested, and only 1 percent were
convicted.”); Goldstein, supra note 14 (“New York City agreed to pay $1.2 million to settle a lawsuit
brought by two female inmates who accused a guard at Rikers Island of repeatedly sexually abusing them.
That guard was never criminally charged and remains employed by the city Correction Department.”).
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. . . failure to exhaust.”169 The district court held administrative exhaustion
procedurally defective here despite the plaintiffs’ allegation “that
administrative remedies were rendered ‘unavailable’ by virtue of threats made
against them.”170 The district court reasoned that because a few of the
plaintiffs did file some form of grievance, this “directly cuts against [their]
argument that the process is unavailable to victims of sexual abuse” and
further that the “evidence does not demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ efforts at
grieving properly were thwarted, but rather shows that they merely selected
to pursue informal avenues instead of the formal grievance procedure.”171
Such cases demonstrate the inherent flaws in the PLRA and prison
grievance procedures,172 and further illustrate the ultimate conclusion that
current forms of legal redress for custodial sexual assault are, at best,
inadequate.173 Given the shortcomings of civil claims and their obvious failure
to mitigate staff sexual abuse of inmates, the following section will explore
the possibility and utility of criminal liability.
IV. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Criminal prosecutions may be the preferable mode of redress for custodial
sexual assault, rather than civil litigation grounded in federal law that is
relatively difficult to bring successfully given the myriad hurdles just
described.174 Indeed, “the majority of people in the U.S. prison population
fall under the jurisdiction of the states, . . . [thus] state criminal laws are
arguably the most important mechanisms for addressing sexual misconduct
in prisons.”175 Criminal cases have rarely been brought against prison staff for
sexual abuse of female inmates;176 a few recent cases have involved criminal
Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2011).
Amador v. Superintendents Dep’t. Corr. Servs., No. 03 Civ. 0650 (KTD)(GWG), 2007 WL 4326747,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2007), vacated in part, dismissed in part by Amadaor v. Andrews, 655 F. 3d 89 (2d Cir. 2011).
171 Id.
172 See supra notes 93–124 and accompanying text (discussing the PLRA and barriers to
prisoner-initiated civil litigation in federal courts).
173 See OWEN ET AL., supra note 21, at 167 (“Sexual misconduct complaints are routinely
dismissed on dubious grounds. Investigations are often superficial and incomplete. And guards who
sexually assault prisoners are rarely punished.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
174 See supra Part III.
175 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 234.
176 That inmates often delay reporting makes the cases against guards more difficult to prove:
169
170

Bringing criminal sex crime charges against corrections officers is rare and difficult.
Inmates, fearful of retaliation, often wait weeks, months or longer to make an allegation,
if they do so at all. When an inmate delays reporting, physical evidence has often
disappeared, making the allegation a matter of the inmate’s word against the guard’s.”
Goldstein, supra note 14; see also Human Rights Watch, supra note 76 (describing Georgia’s handling
of criminal prosecutions of guards for sexually assaulting inmates: “In October and November 1992,
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charges against prison guards and administrative personnel for sexual
misconduct.177 While these cases can—and sometimes do—end in plea
deals,178 bringing criminal charges may be a more effective deterrent of
custodial sexual abuse than civil claims,179 many of which are dismissed for
procedural defects before the merits can be assessed, and which may only
result in liability for the prison employer or supervisor, as opposed to the
individual guard.180 However, criminal cases also suffer from their own
deficiencies in addressing guard-on-inmate sexual assault: prosecutorial
discretion in bringing criminal charges and a hesitation to proceed with cases
against prison personnel make criminal cases an unlikely and seldom-pursued
form of recourse, even when procedurally possible.181
While criminal claims are by no means a substitute for civil claims—indeed,
pursuing both forms of relief may be preferable—criminal liability holds at
least two advantages over civil claims. First, criminal charges are not governed
by the PLRA, and therefore are not limited by the PLRA’s exhaustion, filing
fee, physical injury, or three-strikes provisions.182 Second, statutes of
limitations for criminal sexual assault claims are generally longer; in some
states, there is no statute of limitations for felony sexual assault.183
Criminal cases against prison guards for sexually assaulting female
inmates have been brought successfully and resulted in prison sentences. For
indictments were handed down against fourteen former GWCI or Colony Farm employees on state
criminal law charges ranging from sodomy and sexual assault against a person in custody to rape. A
fifteenth defendant was later indicted after DNA testing showed him to be the father of a prisoner’s
baby . . . . Only two defendants were actually brought to trial on these charges, although two others
pled guilty and were sentenced to terms of probation.”).
177 Goldstein, supra note 14; see also Mike Deak, Fifth Edna Mahan Guard Charged with Sexual
Assault, MYCENTRALJERSEY.COM (Aug. 17, 2017, 5:28 PM), http://www.mycentraljersey.com/
story/news/crime/2017/08/17/fifth-edna-mahan-guard-charged-sexual-assault/577992001/
[https://perma.cc/6S44-JLDH]; Eliott C. McLaughlin, Lawsuit Alleges Georgia Prison Supervisor Raped
Women Inmates, CNN (Feb. 15, 2016, 9:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/15/us/georgia-prison-rapeslawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/R83M-4MH5].
178 See Jerry Iannelli, Miami Federal Prison Guard Gets Eight Months in Jail for Raping Inmate, MIAMI
NEW TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miami-prison-guard-caughtraping-inmate-sentenced-to-eight-months-in-jail-9831049 [https://perma.cc/28TN-PB87] (discussing a
federal prison officer who pled guilty to raping an inmate and received an eight-month sentence).
179 The relative magnitude of civil claims compared to criminal prosecutions likely results, at
least in part, from the ability of prisoner-litigants to bring civil claims pro se.
180 See supra Parts II–III, (discussing barriers to inmate-brought civil litigation and immunities
from civil liability).
181 Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 20.
182 See supra notes 93–124 and accompanying text (describing the PLRA and its effects on
prisoner-filed civil litigation).
183 See generally Brittany Ericksen & Ilse Knecht, Statutes of Limitations for Sexual Assault: A
State-by-State Comparison, VICTIMS OF CRIME (Aug. 21, 2013), https://victimsofcrime.org/docs/
DNA%20Resource%20Center/sol-for-sexual-assault-check-chart---final---copy.pdf?sfvrsn=2
[https://perma.cc/Z6ZK-CTC8].
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example, in Commonwealth v. Black,184 appellant, a guard at Lackawanna
County Prison, faced several sexual misconduct charges.185 Black pled guilty
and was sentenced to up to eight years’ imprisonment and up to ten years’
“special probation.”186 On appeal, Black unsuccessfully challenged his
sentence as unreasonable because it was beyond the sentencing guidelines’
recommendation.187 The Superior Court rejected Black’s arguments and
upheld his prison sentence given the sentencing court’s consideration of
the duration and length of time in which the crimes occurred; the number of
victims; the need to deter similarly situated authority figures; the harm
Appellant had done to the criminal justice system as a whole; and that
Appellant had taken advantage of helpless women. These reasons are
sufficient to sentence outside of the guidelines and in the aggravated range.188

In a New Mexico case, former female inmates successfully brought criminal
charges against prison guard Anthony Townes for multiple instances of sexual
assault.189 In the underlying criminal case, Townes pled guilty to multiple counts
of criminal sexual abuse and false imprisonment.190 Townes conceded that the
factual allegations against him were true, “including that he had unlawfully
restrained or confined Plaintiffs and caused them to engage in sexual intercourse
while they were inmates and while he was in a position of authority over them and
that he was able to use his authority to coerce Plaintiffs to submit to the acts.”191
Here, the New Mexico Supreme Court also found Townes’ employer—the private
correctional facility where he worked—and the prison warden vicariously civilly
liable and responsible for the payment of all civil damage awards.192
Similarly, the Texas case of Marilyn Shirley resulted in both a criminal
conviction and a civil damages award.193 Shirley was serving a four-year prison
sentence for a drug offense when guard Mike Miller raped her.194 She reported
the assault to a prison official and produced the sweatpants she had been
wearing that night, which had Miller’s DNA on them. In her civil case, Shirley
won a four million dollar damages award against Miller, and he was sentenced
No. 700 MDA 2016, 2016 WL 6876487 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 2016).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Spurlock v. Townes, 368 P.3d 1213, 1214 (N.M. 2016).
Id. at 1215.
Id.
Id. at 1218-19.
See Tony Cox, One Woman’s Story of Prison Rape, and Recovery, NPR (Mar. 21, 2007, 9:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9032287 [https://perma.cc/PM58-QJQB] (describing
how the FBI participated in the prison investigation, retrieving DNA evidence that assisted in the case).
194 Id.
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
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to over twelve years in prison on several counts of sexual misconduct.195
Yet another example of successful criminal prosecution of a prison guard
for custodial sexual assault comes from the Sixth Circuit. In United States v.
Smith, the Court of Appeals upheld a federal jury verdict convicting prison
guard Eddie Smith of several sexual offenses against inmates at the Federal
Medical Center in Kentucky.196 At his trial, victims testified about multiple
instances of rape and forced sexual encounters.197 The jury convicted Smith on
almost all counts, and he was sentenced to over twenty years’ imprisonment.198
These cases demonstrate the potential for pursuing criminal prosecutions
against male guards who sexually assault female inmates. While criminal
liability is possible, it is by no means a complete or reliable cure for the defects
of civil litigation. Criminal prosecutions have several shortcomings in the
context of custodial sexual assault. First, accessing the criminal justice system
is particularly hard for incarcerated persons. Unlike an assault victim outside of
prison who can make a police report at any time, incarcerated women—like all
inmates—are at the mercy of prison grievance processes, which have been
documented to be ineffective and are only rarely pursued to the fullest extent
possible.199 Furthermore, inmates have limited access to means of
communication with those outside prison walls, which negatively impacts
inmates’ abilities to report and bring attention to the abuses they suffer while
incarcerated.200 In conjunction “with the extreme difficulty of litigating abuses
in prison, this leaves prison officials free to . . . act largely with impunity.”201
Second, prosecutorial discretion leaves many potential cases untried.202 In
the sexual assault context, prosecutors hesitate to pursue cases due to a lack of
evidence and conflicting accounts; these factors make sexual assault cases “high[]risk” prosecutions.203 Prosecutorial discretion limits custodial sexual assault
cases in particular, due not only to lack of corroborating evidence, but also to
biases against complaining witnesses who are or were incarcerated at the time of
Id.
United States v. Smith, No. 96-5385, 1998 WL 136564, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 1998) (per
curiam), aff ’d, 348 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2003).
197 Smith, 1998 WL 136564, at *1.
198 Smith, 348 F.3d at 549.
199 See supra notes 82–92 and accompanying text (discussing prison grievance processes); see
also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting the ineffectiveness of
prison grievances).
200 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 255.
201 Id.
202 See Mary Graw Leary, Affirmatively Replacing Rape Culture with Consent Culture, 49 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1, 29 (2016) (“Prosecutors have the discretion to decide which cases will be charged and which
will not.”); see also Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape As
Sexual Abuse of Power, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 179 (2011) (“Prosecutors are reluctant to pursue
criminal charges in cases that are viewed as highly contested, controversial, and ambiguous.”).
203 Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 20.
195
196
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their assault.204 Cases by female inmates against prison guards are especially
challenging and thus unattractive to prosecute because of not only the inherent
uphill battle of sexual assault cases generally, but also the problems of
“unsympathetic victims, delayed reports of the assault, lack of physical evidence,
poor investigations, and conflicting testimony” in the prison context in
particular.205 Here, inmates are far from “ideal victims” of sexual assault;206 while
“[t]he general public would not condone rape, . . . instead [the public] may
typically accept it as part of prison life.”207 Juries may find inmates inherently
untrustworthy due to their status as offenders.208 Furthermore, from a strategic
perspective, prosecutors may be reluctant to bring charges against corrections
personnel on whom “prosecutors must rely . . . to testify in . . . other criminal
cases.”209 These challenges compound and make criminal prosecutions fewer and
further between in the custodial sexual assault context.210 Because there is no pro
se analog in the criminal justice system, the progression of an inmate’s criminal
case against a guard depends not only on the pursuit of prison grievances, but
also on a prosecutor’s willingness to take the case to court.211
The burden of proof in criminal prosecutions also makes these cases
tougher to bring successfully. A criminal case against a guard must meet the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, which is especially difficult where
prosecutors have limited, if any, evidence other than a complaining victim’s
testimony.212 Additionally, “timing often creates a problem for criminal
prosecutions”213 when a prison grievance procedure has already taken place
and the administrative investigation yielded findings in favor of the guard214
or no further investigation at all due to lack of substantiation.215

Id.
Id.; see also id. at 23 (noting that the prison context, corroborating and physical evidence is
often completely absent).
206 Brenner et al., supra note 7, at 540 (“Prisoners face a societal brand of deviance that carries with it
assumptions about their behavior because they committed a crime for which they are serving time. These
assumptions are powerful enough to bar them from attaining the characteristics of ‘ideal victimhood.’”).
207 Thompson, supra note 77, at 135; see also supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text
(discussing credibility problems generally and their applicability to the prison context in particular).
208 Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 21.
209 Id. at 20.
210 See Santo, supra note 9 (noting that in forty-six percent of Texas cases involving inmates’
complaints of staff sexual abuse, prosecution was declined, and in nineteen percent of these cases,
there was no indictment or the case was dismissed).
211 Id.
212 Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 20-21.
213 Id. at 21.
214 Id.
215 See McGuire, supra note 4 (“In the vast majority of cases that are not substantiated, prison
officials conclude that there is not enough evidence to establish that the offense occurred.”); see also
supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text (describing corroboration requirements).
204
205
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Finally, there is the argument that given the ongoing and unmitigated
nature of staff sexual abuse in women’s prisons,216 perhaps criminal cases are
not powerful deterrents. Criminal charges have been brought against prison
guards and resulted in sentences of imprisonment,217 but violence against
incarcerated women has not abated.218 Indeed, without a shift in advocacy
regarding—and attention to—the plight of incarcerated women at the hands
of predatory guards, it might be that the wave of condemning sexual assault
perpetrated by powerful men, and its potential deterrent effects, “cannot[]
reverberate through prison walls.”219
V. AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FEMINIST LEGAL ADVOCACY
Given the failures of legislative reform and shortcomings of redress in the
courts, what should be done about guards’ sexual assaults of incarcerated
women? This problem is recognized, documented, and increasingly prevalent;
existing legislation and legal remedies clearly have not fully addressed it.220
While criminal prosecution may be a more promising avenue than civil
litigation, it remains a rarely pursued and still imperfect remedy.221 Feminist
legal advocacy—in courts and in coalitions more broadly—may be able to
contribute to filling this void. Feminist legal advocacy does not provide a
singular answer to the problem of custodial sexual assault,222 but three key
proposals—statutory reform,223 prison abolition,224 and decriminalization of
certain behaviors—will be addressed in turn.
A. Statutory Reform: Politically Possible, Practically Ineffectual
Prison reform agendas have historically focused on statutory and
legislative change. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most
Supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 189–198 and accompanying text (describing criminal cases against prison
guards for sexually assaulting female inmates).
218 See INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 232 (noting that BJS reports in response to PREA
requirements “confirm the . . . finding of highly variable but persistent prevalence [of custodial sexual assault]”).
219 Natasha Lennard, Will The Prison Rape Epidemic Ever Have Its Weinstein Moment?, THE
INTERCEPT (Nov. 21, 2017, 4:08 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/11/21/prison-rape-sexualassault-violence/ [https://perma.cc/U27W-J7TE]; see also supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text
(describing current sexual assault cases receiving media attention).
220 Supra notes 3–11 and accompanying text.
221 See supra Part IV.
222 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist Responses to Violent Injustice, 32
NEW ENG. L. REV. 967, 972 (1998) (“There is no general feminist theory for responding to violence;
indeed, there apparently is no general feminist response to criminal justice, international law, or
even domestic violence issues.”).
223 Gabriel Arkles, Regulating Prison Sexual Violence, 7 NE. U. L.J. 71, 121-29 (2015).
224 Frank, supra note 13, at 23.
216
217
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prison reformers were religiously and politically conservative, upper- and
middle-class white women concerned with opening separate prisons for
women.225 These “[e]arly reformers believed that sex was at the root of the
problems that brought women into conflict with the law.”226
More recent statute-based prison reform has maintained the conservative
base of earlier movements. The PREA was itself “spearheaded by human rights,
faith-based, and prison rape victims’ advocacy groups” and “largely . . .
attributed to growing conservative concerns about homosexuality and the spread
of AIDS . . . .”227 Couching an end to prison sexual abuse as a way to eliminate
sexual relations—and consequences of those relations—that conservatives in
particular found undesirable effectively made the PREA “politically salient for
the Republican-dominated Congress” in power in the early 2000s.228
Despite the effectiveness of coalitions and political support in passing the
PREA, the law itself has clearly failed to result in any measurable decline in—
let alone an end to—custodial sexual abuse.229 The PREA’s ineffectiveness
stems not only from its lack of “teeth” to combat custodial sexual assault
meaningfully, but in its failure to consult those most familiar with prison
conditions and administration.230 To the extent that passing the PREA involved
coalition building, the resulting coalition was not representative of the key

Smith, supra note 27, at 198.
Id.; see also McGuire, supra note 4 (“Progressive-era reformers, who were mostly white,
upper class women, advocated changes designed to protect female inmates from predatory and
abusive male correctional officers.”).
227 Lisa Pasko, Damaged Daughters: The History of Girls’ Sexuality and the Juvenile Justice System,
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1099, 1125 (2010); see also Brenda V. Smith, The Prison Rape
Elimination Act: Implementation and Unresolved Issues, 3 CRIM. L. BR. 10, 10 (2008) (“There were also
significant concerns about homosexual sex—a key issue for conservative constituencies—and the
spread of AIDS to ‘innocent’ defendants. In particular, Prison Fellowship Ministries, The Hudson
Institute, and other Christian organizations were visible proponents of PREA and testified about
these issues.”). However, some authors characterize this coalition as more politically diverse. See
Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1693, 1737 (2006) (noting that the PREA “was the result of a remarkable coalition of advocacy groups
ranging from conservative organizations, like Focus on the Family, the Christian Coalition, and the
Hudson Institute, to civil and human rights groups”).
228 Smith, supra note 227, at 11; see also INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 234 (noting “[t]he
advocacy movement that spurred the passage of state laws criminalizing all sexual conduct between
custodial officials and prisoners.”).
229 See Frank, supra note 13, at 13 (“PREA is not simply a law without teeth, but one without
stakes. It acknowledges that it cannot mandate compliance, and even, if it could, compliance would
have an immeasurable effect.”).
230 Id.; see also Smith, supra note 227, at 11 (noting that “correctional actors . . . were caught unaware
by the passage of PREA” and that “PREA’s initial proponents did not involve established advocates and
litigators who had primarily litigated and worked on issues of sexual abuse of women in custody.”).
225
226
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stakeholders in this arena; ultimately, there was a fundamental disconnect
between the words of the legislation and the realities on the ground.231
Suggestions sounding in legislative reform include introducing a statutory
scheme that works to prevent sexual assault and offer redress when it does occur.
This plan would aim to prevent custodial sexual assault by, for example,
suspending terms of incarceration “if the person sentenced is highly likely to be
unlawfully sexually assaulted in detention or has actually been unlawfully sexually
assaulted in detention,” and creating a presumption that all incarcerated women
are at an increased risk of sexual assault.232 Other parts of the proposed statutory
scheme would include measures to mitigate sexual assault by ending solitary
confinement, cracking down on retaliation for reporting sexual assault, and
compensate victims of custodial sexual violence with monetary damages.233
The problem with this approach, however, is operationalizing it. Statutory
schemes like the PREA have already proven to be ineffective. It is not clear
what further regulation would achieve or that state governments would
comply with monetary damage awards absent civil litigation demanding such
judgments.234 While the PREA and PLRA were politically popular,235
statutory enforcement has been lacking,236 and efforts at reform have been
empty.237 Furthermore, it is unclear if future statute-based reform would be
more inclusive of those who are familiar with prison sexual violence, let alone
anyone who has experienced sexual assault while incarcerated. This approach
would likely replicate the problems and pitfalls of the PREA.
B. Ending the Carceral State?
Another possibility is to make mass incarceration central to the feminist
legal-advocacy agenda and to end women’s prisons in particular.238 As Victoria

231 Supra notes 109–118 and accompanying text (noting the failure of the PLRA to define
“physical injury,” which has had unintended consequences for victims of custodial sexual assault).
232 Arkles, supra note 221, at 122.
233 Id. at 123-25.
234 Thompson, supra note 77, at 175 (“In thinking about the campaign to eliminate rape in
prison, it remains clear that more than a legislative mandate will be required.”).
235 See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, Federal Government Increases Pressure on States to Stop Prison
Rape, (Feb. 17, 2014), https://eji.org/news/federal-government-increases-pressure-to-stop-prison-rape
[https://perma.cc/LD3F-GDM4] (noting that PREA passed with unanimous, bipartisan support).
236 Frank, supra note 13, at 13.
237 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 230 (“While numerous efforts have been made to
reform the PLRA, as of today none have been successful.”).
238 Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally
About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1450 (2012) (“Among the most robust
connections between earlier contestations around violence against women and the contemporary
rhetorics surrounding mass incarceration are the discursive elisions that have characterized antiracist
and feminist approaches to both of these social problems.”).
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Law posits, the “carceral variant of feminism continues to be the predominant
form. While its adherents would likely reject the descriptor, carceral
feminism describes an approach that sees increased policing, prosecution, and
imprisonment as the primary solution to violence against women.”239 The
approach of carceral feminism has been criticized for excluding the voices of
women most likely to be affected by incarceration: women of color.240
Commentators also point out the inherent tension between ending violence
against women through “increasing policing, prosecution, and incarceration”
rates and ending incarceration of women more generally.241
An extreme approach advanced by some advocates is to end women’s prisons
entirely. The crux of the argument is that without any such facilities, there would
be no opportunity for custodial sexual assault of incarcerated women.242 Advocates
in favor of this approach note the “extreme violence, dehumanization, racialized
degradation and indignity” to which inmates are subject.243 Because prisons “cannot
reasonably guarantee incarcerated women will be free from sexual victimization”
and such “substantial danger of sexual victimization is unconscionable,” the
argument goes, no female correctional facility should remain.244 Prison abolition
advocates see the closure of all-female correctional facilities as a precursor to ending
most, if not all, modes of incarceration more generally.245
While this approach would eliminate the opportunity for custodial sexual
assault of female inmates, it does not seem to be a realistic solution. Prison
abolition would be a radical departure from prevailing modes of social order and
criminal justice; it would require, in sum, “a very different social landscape.”246
Indeed, the call for prison abolition “is an aspirational ethical, institutional, and
political framework that aims to fundamentally reconceptualize security and
collective social life, rather than simply a plan to tear down prison walls.”247 It is
difficult to imagine a time where arguing for the end of prisons would be a
239 Victoria Law, Against Carceral Feminism, JACOBIN (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.jacobin
mag.com/2014/10/against-carceral-feminism/ [https://perma.cc/52UM-DYCH].
240 Krishna de la Cruz, Comment, Exploring the Conflicts Within Carceral Feminism: A Call to Revocalize
the Women Who Continue to Suffer, 19 SCHOLAR: ST. MARY’S L. REV. RACE & SOC. JUST. 79, 81 (2016).
241 Id.; see also Gottschalk, supra note 227, at 1721 (“[F]ew feminists considered that by enlisting
the state to combat violence against women, women’s groups might be contributing to the
construction of the carceral state.”).
242 Frank, supra note 13, at 20.
243 Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1156, 1172 (2015).
244 Frank, supra note 13, at 21.
245 Id. at 20; see also Michele C. Nielsen, Beyond PREA: An Interdisciplinary Framework for
Evaluating Sexual Violence in Prisons, 64 UCLA L. REV. 230, 276 (2017) (describing McLeod’s prison
abolition argument that all prisons should cease operating “save for perhaps the terrible few inmates
who are beyond redemption and too much of a threat to society to ever be released”).
246 Angela Y. Davis & Dylan Rodriguez, The Challenge of Prison Abolition: A Conversation, 27
SOC. JUST. 212, 215 (2000).
247 McLeod, supra note 243, at 1167-68.
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politically expedient or popular agenda; the carceral system is “deeply
entrenched” in the fabric of American social and political life.248
C. Noncriminal Alternatives and Decriminalization
The third and final approach addressed here is the middle ground between
statutory reform on the one hand, and wholesale institutional and
sociocultural reconceptualization on the other. Noncriminal alternatives
reject using the state or criminal justice system, but instead focus on
decriminalizing certain behaviors, addressing underlying sociocultural and
economic disparities, and utilizing restorative justice in lieu of criminal
sanctions to address interpersonal and domestic violence.249 The objective of
this strategy is to reduce the number of women in prison. This advocacy is
not directed at ending or reforming prisons, but the effect of decriminalizing
drug-related and nonviolent offenses for which most incarcerated women are
serving time, along with ending mandatory-arrest and no-drop domestic
violence policies,250 may be to reduce the number of women who are
incarcerated, and in turn, reduce incidents of custodial sexual violence.251
Noncriminal alternatives that could address custodial sexual violence are
those that keep women out of prisons ex ante. These reforms aim to answer
the shortcomings and criticisms of carceral feminism by disrupting cycles of
violence that are largely responsible for landing women in prison. People who
are incarcerated are more likely than the general population to have faced
sexual abuse or violence during childhood or their adult lives before prison.252
This is especially true for women who are incarcerated. As the editors of
Inside This Place, Not of It note,
One of the most striking things about our experience in collecting these
narratives has been the overwhelming prevalence of histories of sexual abuse.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, two-thirds of women in prison

248 Gottschalk, supra note 227, at 1748; see id. (“Political leaders, whatever their intentions and
strategic preferences, are highly constrained by the institutional landscape.”).
249 See Arkles, supra note 223, at 121 (“Traditional law reform cannot end carceral sexual violence.”).
250 Infra note 255 and accompanying text.
251 See infra (discussing the makeup of women’s prison populations, the offenses for which women most
commonly receive prison sentences, and linkages between past interpersonal violence and incarceration).
252 Nancy Wolff, Jing Shi, & Jane A. Siegel, Patterns of Victimization Among Male and Female
Inmates: Evidence of an Enduring Legacy, 24 VIOLENCE VICT. 469 (2009), https://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3793850/pdf/nihms168246.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HKR-CX25].
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have experienced sexual and physical abuse in their lives, a statistic that was
reflected in our interviews.”253

Studies have found linkages between past sexual trauma, interpersonal
violence, and incarceration.254 Perhaps addressing the ongoing problems of sexual
and interpersonal violence will reduce alcohol and drug problems in women, which
are among the most common causes for the surging female inmate population.255
More intersectional, diverse coalitions taking aim at sexual and domestic
violence in its myriad forms might also break cycles of violence that result in
victims of abuse being imprisoned. Criminalizing domestic and interpersonal
violence has resulted in negative consequences and sometimes criminal
punishments for women victims.256 At present, the response to domestic and
interpersonal violence is “arrest, prosecution, and punishment” in the form of
no-drop prosecution policies and mandatory arrests when reports are made to
police.257 This approach has been sharply criticized by feminist legal advocates
who note that women of color are both reluctant to involve police and are more
likely to face consequences as a result of mandatory-arrest policies.258 Feminist
legal advocates have argued that victims should, at the very least, retain more
autonomy after domestic-violence-related arrest is made; removing the victim’s
agency in this process can be revictimizing.259 Instead, “experimenting with

253 INSIDE THIS PLACE, supra note 24, at 18; see also Wolff et al., supra note 252, at 477
(reporting that 54% of female inmates in study “experienced sexual abuse as children . . . 47% of
female inmates[] reported childhood sexual victimization”).
254 See Angela Browne, Brenda Miller, & Eugene Maguin, Prevalence and Severity of Lifetime Physical
and Sexual Victimization Among Incarcerated Women, 22 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 301, 312 (1999)
(“[R]esults show that a substantial majority of the sample of women in the general corrections population
reported having experienced sexual molestation or severe violence prior to the current incarceration.”).
255 Id. at 302-03.
256 See de la Cruz, supra note 240, at 89 (“[I]t is irrational to support laws that criminalize and
imprison victims.”); Law, supra note 239 (noting that mandatory arrest policies in relation to
domestic violence complaints “have also led to dual arrests, in which police handcuff both parties
because they perceive each as assailants”).
257 Beth E. Richie, How Anti-Violence Activism Taught Me to Become a Prison Abolitionist, THE
FEMINIST WIRE (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.thefeministwire.com/2014/01/how-anti-violence-activism-taughtme-to-become-a-prison-abolitionist/ [https://perma.cc/86SX-424X]; see also ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER,
BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 181 (2000) (discussing “[t]he development of
mandatory arrest litigation, which made domestic violence a crime” and how police “frequently arrest
both battering men and the women they batter. Many women who are battered are reluctant to charge
their batterers with a crime, and many prosecutor’s offices have developed controversial ‘no-drop’
policies, which can force women to face criminal charges if they refuse to testify against their assailant.”).
258 Law, supra note 239.
259 Minow, supra note 222, at 977. As one author posits,

As domestic violence policies have endeavored to remove discretion from the various
institutional actors, the victim’s control over the process has been removed. There are
several compelling reasons for shifting the control from the victim to the criminal
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alternative approaches for dealing with violence against women and other
crimes, such as restorative justice programs,”260 and community-based peermentorship initiatives, may be more successful than mandatory, state-sanctioned
penal responses that can have negative consequences for female victims.261
Reducing the female prison population would require the decriminalization
of drug offenses and other nonviolent crimes for which most women are serving
time.262 Drug-related offenses, along with “immigration violations and
nonviolent . . . offenses,” are the largest contributors to female inmate
population growth.263 Many female offenders are “the unwitting or reluctant
accomplices to abusive partners,”264 or develop drug habits in response to past
abuse or sexual victimization, committing drug or property-related crimes to
feed their addictions.265 Therefore, decriminalizing minor drug and propertyrelated offenses—along with more autonomous forms of redress for
interpersonal violence—could interrupt destructive cycles that lead women to
prison and reduce the number of incarcerated women on the whole.
The first step to decreasing female inmate populations is decriminalization
of minor drug offenses. Several states have already decriminalized marijuana
possession.266 By contrast, wholesale decriminalization of domestic violence is
justice system . . . . The effect of mandatory policies, however, may be to strip the
victim of any sense of control and to foster a sense of disempowerment.
Christine O’Connor, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy Rights of Victims, 80
B.C. L. REV. 937, 961 (1999)
260 Gottschalk, supra note 227, at 1724.
261 Nielsen, supra note 245, at 277; see also Law, supra note 239 (describing various communitybased initiatives and programs aimed at curbing domestic and interpersonal violence, outside the
realm of state-sanctioned criminalization).
262 Buchanan notes,
Since the advent of the war on drugs, imprisonment of women has increased even
faster than the imprisonment of men. Between 1986 and 2004, the number of women
in prison for all crimes increased 400%, while the number of African American women
in prison increased 800% . . . . The war on drugs has racially targeted African
American women and Latinas as it has their male counterparts; in New York State,
82% of Latinas and 65% of black women sentenced to prison were convicted of drug
crimes, compared to only 40% of white women.
Buchanan, supra note 7, at 52-53 (internal citations omitted); see also Marne L. Lenox,
Neutralizing the Gendered Collateral Consequences of the War on Drugs, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 280, 284
(2011) (“The gendered effects of the War on Drugs persist: In 2003, 29% of women in state prisons
were incarcerated for drug offenses, compared to only 19% of male inmates.”).
263 Kim White, Women in Federal Prison: Pathways In, Programs Out, 14 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 305, 308 (2008).
264 Gottschalk, supra note 227, at 1723.
265 White, supra note 263, at 309-10.
266 States That Have Decriminalized, NAT’L ORG. FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS
(2017), http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/states-that-have-decriminalized [https://perma.cc/7MH9QB6D]; Sophie Quinton, In These States, Past Marijuana Crimes Can Go Away, HUFFINGTON POST
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not feasible: criminal responses are an entrenched mode of dealing with
violent offenses generally, and domestic violence in the United States in
particular.267 Perhaps instead of the total decriminalization of domestic
violence, shifting the mode of criminalization by giving victims more agency
over their cases and doing away with mandatory arrest and prosecution
policies could be a politically salient and practicable middle ground.268 As Aya
Gruber succinctly concludes, “the trend towards addressing the problem of
domestic violence through criminal law will likely continue, and feminists in
the legal arena will not be able simply to ignore the criminal system.”269
In conjunction with combatting sexual and interpersonal violence in all its
forms through noncriminal means, and decriminalization of nonviolent
offenses, is an advocacy opportunity—or perhaps, a necessary precondition—
to demand better and fairer access to resources for communities of color and
women in particular that would help to break cycles of abuse and
incarceration.270 Creating access to more equal education, fair housing, higherwage jobs and professional career opportunities is yet another solution that
will require addressing systemic inequalities.271 Because most incarcerated
women are women of color,272 and communities of color “continue to have the
worst schools, the fewest job opportunities, and the least affordable
housing[,]”273 addressing these inequalities over time would go a long way to
reducing crime rates, and in turn, the female prison population.

(Nov. 20, 2017, 10:09 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/in-these-states-past-marijuanacrimes-can-go-away_us_5a12e8e8e4b023121e0e94e3 [https://perma.cc/LT4B-HW6W].
267 Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in Domestic
Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 161-62 (2003); see also Gottschalk, supra note 227, at
1720-21 (discussing feminists’ decades-long advocacy to bring attention to violence against women
generally, and to criminalization of domestic violence offenses in particular).
268 See Han, supra note 267, at 185-89 (discussing more victim-centric alternatives to mandatory arrest
and no-drop prosecution policies); see also Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741,
820-21 (2007) (discussing various alternatives to and reforms of domestic violence criminalization).
269 Gruber, supra note 268, at 826.
270 See Law, supra note 239 (“[Carceral feminism] fails to address factors that exacerbate abuse,
such as male entitlement, economic inequality, the lack of safe and affordable housing, and the
absence of other resources.”).
271 Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration and Social Inequality, 139 DAEDALUS 8, 8-9 (2010);
see also Nicholas Freudenberg, Adverse Effects of US Jail and Prison Policies on the Health and Well-Being of
Women of Color, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1895, 1895-96 (2002) (“Women in the correctional system are
typically young, poor, and of limited formal educational attainment . . . . Studies conducted in urban jails
have shown that rates of recent homelessness among incarcerated women are as high as 40%.”).
272 See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (discussing the racial makeup of female
inmate populations).
273 Freudenberg, supra note 271, at 1896.
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D. A Way Forward?
The most promising of these solutions is a hybridized version: shifting the
focus of criminalization to decriminalize nonviolent offenses and in turn, end
mass incarceration as it currently exists, while meaningfully and consistently
punishing perpetrators of custodial sexual violence. At first glance, it may
appear inconsistent to argue for decriminalization on one hand while
considering criminal sanctions for guards who sexually assault female inmates
on the other. What is required is a shift in which behaviors are criminalized and
who is imprisoned. Ending mass incarceration in its current form—by
advocating for the decriminalization of minor nonviolent offenses and
supporting bottom-up, community-based initiatives and access to resources to
break cycles of violence, including the end of no-drop and mandatoryprosecution policies—is a worthwhile pursuit of feminist legal advocates, but it
does not necessarily mean ending all incarceration or incarceration for every
offense. Furthermore, to the extent that sexual and interpersonal violence
outside of prison remains criminalized, ending no-drop and mandatory-arrest
policies but retaining criminal liability in a less coercive form limits the
involvement of the state while still allowing a victim to pursue criminal charges;
this can be analogized to the custodial context insofar as an inmate-victim must
first report sexual abuse and undertake grievance procedures in order for a
criminal case to even potentially ensue. Decriminalizing offenses that
disproportionately target poor communities and communities of color while
holding male guards—who are generally non-minorities—responsible for
committing sexual abuse is a reasonable way forward, and would accomplish
dual goals of decreasing female prison populations while still holding
accountable those who sexually violate incarcerated women.
As noted, most women are incarcerated for nonviolent, drug-related
offenses.274 Decriminalizing these violations—and rethinking the so-called
“war on drugs” and the enforcement of its policies—would go a long way to
reduce the number of women in prison.275 This would also likely change the
racial makeup of prisons, since “blacks are nearly four times as likely as whites
to be arrested for drug offenses and 2.5 times as likely to be arrested for drug
possession.”276 While prisons may not ever be wholly abolished in the United

Supra notes 262–265 and accompanying text.
See Marylee Reynolds, The War on Drugs, Prison Building, and Globalization: Catalysts for the
Global Incarceration of Women, NWSA J., Summer 2008, at 72, 72-73 (“A primary catalyst behind
America’s imprisonment binge is the war on drugs . . . . This domestic war has expanded across the
globe and its primary victims have been poor women of color.”).
276 Ashley Nellis, The Color of Justice: Racial and Ethnic Disparity in State Prisons, SENTENCING
PROJECT (June 14, 2016), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-justice-racialand-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons [https://perma.cc/2GQH-ESQ3].
274
275
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States, decreasing prison populations is a worthwhile goal that would, at the
very least, shrink the number of victims of custodial sexual abuse.277
Furthermore, making criminal sanctions for reports of domestic violence
optional, as opposed to a process of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution
that denies victims meaningful agency, may also decrease prison populations.278
Reorienting what and who is criminalized can be consistent with feminist
legal advocacy agendas; disfavoring mass incarceration and advocating for goals
that would effectively spell its end do not equate to decriminalizing all forms
of violence.279 Some feminist legal advocates continue to urge for the criminal
punishment of those who sexually assault or physically violate women.280 Male
guards who sexually abuse female inmates arguably fall into the narrow “terrible
few” for whom carceral punishment is required.281 Ending mass incarceration
does not necessarily mean ending all incarceration, unless the end of mass
incarceration is equated with complete prison abolition, which, as discussed, is
an unlikely outcome.282 However, ending mass incarceration can mean
decreasing prison populations, which decriminalizing the underlying offenses
for which most women are incarcerated in the first place would achieve.283
One could argue that there is tension in advocating for decriminalization
of the behaviors that land many women in prison while still criminalizing
sexual assault committed by guards upon female inmates. There are a few
responses to this criticism. First, as demonstrated here, the prison context is
fundamentally different; the power dynamics at play, compounded by racial
and gender hierarchies, as well as the particular inability of incarcerated
women to seek redress for the harms they suffer in prison, makes criminal
liability for guards who sexually assault inmates one of the limited ways to
address this problem. Indeed, as one author has noted, the “location of this
violence and the identity of the victim” sets the custodial sexual assault
context apart from other forms of violence against women and the movements
dedicated to addressing those iterations of violence.284 Approaches to curbing
and eventually ending guards’ sexual abuse of incarcerated women, therefore,
277 See supra notes 218–273 and accompanying text (assessing potential approaches to ending
custodial sexual assault).
278 Supra notes 269-271 and accompanying text.
279 See Gruber, supra note 268, at 824 (concluding that while “feminists [should] stop supporting
incarceration” this does not necessarily translate to “argu[ing] for decriminalizing domestic violence.”).
280 Gottschalk, supra note 227, at 1724; see also Thompson, supra note 77, at 172 (“[I]t will be incumbent
upon those individuals who are seeking to raise awareness about rape in custody to paint a picture of
victimization that reflects the reality of rape in an environment where the victim is powerless.”).
281 Nielsen, supra note 245, at 276.
282 Supra notes 244–246 and accompanying text.
283 See Gottschalk, supra note 227, at 1696 (describing ideal penal reform as “slashing the US
incarceration rate to a level comparable to other advanced industrialized countries”).
284 Thompson, supra note 77, at 163.
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cannot neatly borrow from other forms of antiviolence advocacy that wholly
condemn or encourage criminal sanctions as a mode of redress.285
Second, there is a distinction to be made between 1) decriminalizing minor,
nonviolent offenses and rethinking mandatory arrests and prosecution for
domestic violence disputes and 2) prosecuting guard-on-inmate sexual assault:
criminalizing the former has been a form of “support[ing] social hierarchies
related to race and gender,” in that those offenses disproportionately affect the
lives of people of color,286 while underlying the criminalization of the latter is
a reluctance to recognize violence committed by white men against women of
color.287 This hybrid approach thus avoids the pitfalls of relatively extreme
advocacy—that for total prison abolition and ends to all forms of
criminalization, which seem unlikely at best—while retaining the practicality
of approaches that have already taken root, such as decriminalizing minor drug
offenses.288 Similarly, reframing mandatory-arrest and no-drop prosecution
policies as options, rather than obligations, maintains criminalization of
violence when sought by victims, rather than when coerced by the state.289
It is not inconsistent to advocate for the decriminalization of what results
in women’s incarceration ex ante while arguing for accountability for the harms
they suffer while in prison ex post. Feminist legal advocates should focus on
reducing women’s prison populations to the extent feasible. But assuming that
women’s prisons will continue to exist, given the unlikelihood of total prison
abolition in the United States, custodial sexual assault will also persist.290
Therefore, feminist legal advocates can argue for an end to mass incarceration
while still favoring some incarceration, namely that of guards who sexually
abuse and violate female inmates. The fundamental difference is who is
incarcerated and for what offense; taking seriously incarcerated women’s
accounts of sexual abuse in prison and consistently holding their abusers
criminally accountable would be a marked departure from the status quo.291
Feminist legal advocacy in this arena need not be zero sum. Advocacy
agendas that aim to decrease prison populations in the long run implicitly seek
to end custodial sexual assault, but advocates concerned with the prevalence of
sexual violence in women’s prisons must also contend with the current realities
of the problem. Criminalizing guards’ sexual assaults of female inmates may
provide an imperfect-yet-possible short-term advocacy opportunity for those
who both want to end this form of sexual violence and who, taking the long view,
285
286
287
288
289
290
291

Id.
See supra notes 254–267 and accompanying text.
Arkles, supra note 223, at 76-77.
See supra notes 244–246, 268–271 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 268–271.
See supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.

772

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 733

seek to decrease prison populations on the whole. To the degree that custodial
sexual assault is criminalized, a more concrete avenue for feminist legal advocacy
to explore in the immediate future is better training of prosecutors handling
inmates’ criminal sexual assault complaints against guards. In their report, Smith
and Yarussi note that “prosecutors are not sufficiently knowledgeable about
prisons, prison culture or correctional practices. Federal investigators also felt
that prosecutors did not have sufficient knowledge of issues such as the coercive
influence of contraband on sex and security in the institution.”292 A
straightforward solution would be to require state and federal prosecutors—or
representatives of any prosecutor’s office who would be handling prisoner
complaints—to attend trainings on how to respond to the particular sensitivities
and procedural hurdles of these cases. This would inherently require addressing
and breaking down stereotypically held notions of inmates as unreliable victims
whose complaints against guards cannot be trusted.293
Feminist legal advocacy as it pertains to custodial sexual assault can avoid
the pitfalls of earlier prison reform movements by including the voices of
communities most affected by incarceration—communities of color generally
and those who are or were incarcerated in particular.294 Multiple advocacy
groups are already engaged in combating mass incarceration in general and the
challenges faced by incarcerated women in particular. 295 Some of these
projects not only cater to incarcerated women, but are created by them.296
Thus, the challenge will be for “mainstream” feminist legal advocacy—and the
law more generally—to adopt these attitudes and take seriously incarcerated
women’s narratives, lived experiences, and complaints of sexual violence
perpetrated by those tasked with protecting them. Sexual violence in prison
does not have to be an “inevitable” reality;297 in particular, male guards
committing acts of sexual violence against female inmates does not have to be
Smith & Yarussi, supra note 73, at 23.
Id. at 23-24.
See supra notes 223–226 (describing the political and religious leanings of statute-based
prison reform movements); notes 260–623; 272–274 (discussing communities most impacted by
incarceration and the criminalization of drug offenses).
295 Though by no means an exhaustive list, some of these groups include: ALLIANCE FOR
SAFETY AND JUSTICE, https://www.allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/who-we-are/; JUSTLEADERSHIP USA,
https://www.justleadershipusa.org/advocacy/; PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/.
296 See, e.g., WOMEN AND PRISON, http://www.womenandprison.org/; WOMEN IN PRISON
PROJECT, http://www.correctionalassociation.org/pp/about-women-in-prison-project; COALITION FOR
WOMEN PRISONERS, http://www.correctionalassociation.org/coalition/coalition-for-women-prisoners;
YOUNG WOMEN’S FREEDOM CENTER, http://www.youngwomenfree.org/; WORTH, http://www.
womenontherise-worth.org/; WOMEN’S PRISON ASSOCIATION, http://www.wpaonline.org/about/whatwe-do; WOMEN’S PRISON BOOK PROJECT, https://wpbp.org/.
297 Nick Malinowski, NYC Official Says Rape Is Inevitable at Rikers Island: If True, We Cannot Send
Anyone There, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (June 26, 2016, 7:41 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
nick-malinowski/nyc-official-says-rape-is_b_10600320.html [https://perma.cc/32T5-7Y6Y].
292
293
294
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a defining feature of U.S. correctional facilities. But making accountability an
accessible avenue for inmate-victims—thus ending the impunity that marks
this specific type of sexual abuse—remains an open challenge.298

298 See generally Buchanan, supra note 7 (describing the prevalence of sexual assault of female
inmates by prison guards in the framework of a status regime).
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